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WHEN BLOOD IS THEIR
ARGUMENT:' PROBABILITIES IN
CRIMINAL CASES, GENETIC
MARKERS, AND, ONCE
AGAIN, BAYES' THEOREM
Randolph N Jonakait*
I. INTRODUCTION
Revolutionary advances in blood typing soon will cause a dra-
matic increase in the presentation of statistical evidence in criminal tri-
als. Courts have admitted statistics into criminal trials before, and the
proper use of this type of evidence has been debated previously. Until
now, however, such mathematical evidence has been rare.2 Recently,
however, a number of courts have admitted probability evidence de-
rived from new and complex blood tests. Such evidence may soon be
as commonplace as fingerprint testimony. The courts that have admit-
ted this evidence, however, have done so without learning from past
discussions about the proper role of statistical evidence. Because our
criminal justice system is now at the threshold of an explosion in the
presentation of this mathematical testimony, it is important to explore
the use and misuse of such statistics in criminal trials.
After surveying the recent and ongoing revolution in forensic se-
rology, this article addresses the proper function of serological
probability evidence at trial. The article examines, and rejects, recent
commentary suggesting Bayes' Theorem as a possible vehicle for
presenting this statistical evidence at trial. The article concludes that at
present no workable method exists for the effective and fair introduc-
tion of blood marker probability statistics at trial.
1. W. Shakespeare, King Henry V, act IV, scene i.
* Associate Professor, Pace University Law School, A.B. 1967, Princeton University, J.D.
1970, University of Chicago Law School LL.M. 1971, New York University. The author gratefully
acknowledges the advice and assistance of Dr. G. Miller Jonakait and Linda Tacoma.
2. One scholar who has advocated a broader use of statistics in criminal trials has con-
cluded, "Although probability theory is used widely as a tool for the production of evidence in
some areas of law, its formal use in criminal trials has been severely limited." Braun, Quantitative
Analysis and the Law: Probability Theory as a Tool of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1982 UTAH L.
REV. 41, 42. See also Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
HARV. L. REV. 488, 488 n.2 (1970).
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II. BLOOD GROUPS AND GENETIC MARKERS
Until recently, forensic serologists usually could classify blood into
only one of four genetically controlled groups.3 Although it may have
been of great value to learn whether a blood sample or stain found at a
crime scene came from the victim or the defendant or someone else, the
traditional blood typing tests were of little value to a prosecutor since
many people fit into each of the four groups.'
A decade or two ago, however, serologists began to use a new pro-
cedure to type genetic factors in the blood. This procedure, electro-
phoresis, now allows the serologist to discover many more blood
groups than did the traditional tests.5 Indeed, forensic serologists be-
lieve that in the future they will be able to match a blood sample with
the individual from whom it was taken.6
Although that day has not yet been reached,7 proponents of ge-
3. The four types of the ABO system are types A, B, AB, and 0. This is an antigen system.
Antigens are grouped by tests relying on agglutination, or the clumping together, of the red cells in
the blood. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 6.11, at
298 (1978).
4. One forensic serologist explains:
When [ABO] blood grouping was successful, the evidential value of the findings was often
limited. For example, a suspect in a homicide may have had a bloodstain on his shirtcuff
which investigators believed could have come from the victim. How significant would the
following findings be in associating the suspect with the victim? Suppose the suspect was of
Group 0 while the victim was of Group A and the bloodstain on the suspect's cuff was of
Group A. We know the stain could not have come from the suspect but on this determination
alone it could have come from the victim. On the other hand, it is realized that about forty-
two percent of our population is of Group A. Therefore, the finding of Group A blood on the
cuff cannot in itself carry much weight.
Baird, The Individuality of Blood and Bloodstains, I I J. CANADIAN SOC. FORENSIC SCI. 83, 103
(1978). Such evidence, while it might exclude a suspect from consideration when the relevant
blood samples did not match, was of little probative value in establishing a suspect as the guilty
party when those samples did match.
5. Many blood components exist in genetically distinct variations. These substances are
called polymorphic, which means that although the substances may take different forms, they all
serve the same function in the body. Electrophoresis separates some of the polymorphic blood
enzymes and other proteins through the use of an electrical current. The blood factors identified
by the traditional agglutination tests are often called blood groups or types. The broader term
"genetic markers" is applied to the factors identified by the traditional procedure as well as by
electrophoresis. For a more complete description of the tests and their history see Jonakait, Will
Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.J. 833, 836-43 (1983); Baird, supra
note 4, at 109-20.
6. Dr. Baird, supra note 4, at 286 asserts, "The evolution of forensic blood grouping is
likely to reach a point in the next decade where the goal of identifying the individual is achieved."
This belief rests on the faith that each person's blood is singular. See, e.g., Diamond, The Story of
Our Blood Groups, in BLOOD, PURE AND ELOQUENT 691 (M. Wintrobe ed. 1980):
From the modest start of four types, the individual characteristics of blood cells have been so
greatly expanded that it is now highly improbable that any two people except identical twins
would have the same combination of red cell surface markers. In other words, every person
on earth is unique in his or her combination of blood groups-a fact recognized only the past
thirty years.
7. "Absolute individualization of blood, while theoretically possible, is not a practical goal
for any laboratory." Grunbaum, Potential and Limitations of Forensic Blood Analysis, in HAND-
BOOK FOR FORENSIC INDIVIDUALIZATION OF HUMAN BLOOD 2 (B.W. Grunbaum ed. 1981). "It is
not yet possible to individualize blood in the same way as one can a fingerprint, but this is because
of a lack of knowledge of techniques and not because of the nature of blood." B. CULLIFORD,
[Vol. 1983
BLOOD MARKERS
netic factor typing believe that they already have a revolutionary evi-
dentiary tool. The tests now nearly can tell if a blood sample came
from a specified individual. As one serologist contends, "[W]e are now
facing a situation wherein it is almost possible to characterize human
bloodstains to the extent that they can be as individualistic as finger-
prints."' The scientists claim that as they identify each additional ge-
netic marker in a blood sample, they can prove that the sample could
have come only from an increasingly smaller percentage of the popula-
tion. They reason that if genetic markers X, Y, and Z each appear in
50% of the populace, the discovery of one marker in a blood sample
merely indicates that half of the world could have been the source of
the blood. If two of the markers, however, are found in a sample, the
forensic scientist would multiply 50% times 50% and determine that the
blood could have originated in only 25% of the population. If the sam-
ple contains three markers, only 12.5% of all people could have been
the source of the sample. If enough genetic markers are typed or if any
of the discovered markers were rarer, the serologist could conclude that
the sample could only have come from a small percentage of the popu-
lation, sometimes so small as to be almost infinitesimal.9
This percentage, this number stating how frequently a combina-
tion of blood genetic markers appears in the population, is a
probability statistic.' 0 As evidence in a criminal trial, the value to the
prosecution of blood grouping depends precisely upon this probability
or frequency figure. I " Assume, for example, that a person is stabbed to
THE EXAMINATION AND TYPING OF BLOODSTAINS IN THE CRIME LABORATORY 15 (1981). But see
Selvin, Grunbaum & Myhre, The Probability of Non-discrimination or Likelihood of Guilt of an
Accused" Criminal Identoqcation, 23 J. FORENSIC Soc. Sci. 27, 30 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Probability]: "Not surprisingly, using a large number of [genetic marker] systems makes it possi-
ble, at least theoretically, to discriminate between two samples of blood so that innocent individu-
als are almost certainly excluded."
8. Baird, supra note 4, at 121.
9. A genetic marker system is one in which a substance in the blood appears in genetically
distinct variations. Such a substance is said to be polymorphic, which means "having different
molecular forms but the same biochemical function." Grunbaum, supra note 7, at 3. Thus
phosphoglucomatase (PGM) is polymorphic and can take different forms such as PGM I or PGM
2-1. Each of the different forms of PGM or any other genetic marker system is called a phenotype.
Thus, type A blood is a phenotype of the ABO system. See Jonakait, supra note 5, at 839-40. At
least 62 blood genetic marker systems have been identified. See Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines- Pres-
ent Status of Serologic Testing Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976). Forensic
laboratories do not attempt to type all of these systems in a blood sample. Instead, in addition to
PGM, other systems commonly classified are adenylate kinase (AK), adenosine deaminase
(ADA), esterace D (EsD), erythrocyte acid phosphotase (EAP), and haptoglobin (Hp).
A biostatistician has calculated that only one person out of every 1297 has the most common
phenotypes for nine frequently typed genetic marker systems. Selvin, StatisticalAnalysis of Blood
Genetic Evidence, in HANDBOOK FOR FORENSIC INDIVIDUALIZATION OF HUMAN BLOOD AND
BLOODSTAINS 177 (B.W. Grunbaum ed. 1981).
10. See Braun, supra note 2, at 45-46.
11. "The usefulness of these [genetic marker] determinations in the criminal justice system is
dependent upon a knowledge of the frequency of occurrence of these genetic factors in a general
population or in a specified subpopulation." Grunbaum, supra note 7, at 3. See also Grunbaum,
Selvin, Myhre & Pace, Distribution of Gene Frequencies and Discrimination Probabilities for 22
Human Blood Genetic Systems in Four Racial Groups, 25 J. FORENSIC SCi. 428, 428 (1980) [herein-
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death, and a suspect is placed into custody a short while later. Blood-
stains are found on the defendant's clothes. If that blood came from
the victim it would be a strong indication of guilt. The blood tests,
however, cannot show that the sample actually is the victim's blood.
Instead, they might show that the bloodstain and the victim's blood do
not match. Even if markers from the two samples do match, however,
this match is not very probative because many other people may have
the same genetic markers in their blood. 2 Instead, the genetic marker
evidence is useful only when the prosecution can prove that the blood
samples match and that a limited portion of the population has this
particular combination of genetic markers. Thus, the prosecution
wants to present evidence not only that the new blood tests showed the
same genetic markers in both samples, but also that only one in 1000
people, say, have these particular markers.
These blood tests already are widely used by forensic laboratories
throughout the country.' 3 Because the tests are so new, however, re-
sults are only now beginning to appear in the reported criminal cases.
Because the individualization of blood could be important in any crim-
inal trial where blood has been shed, these blood tests will soon be seen
in a burgeoning number of cases."4 Since the end result of the genetic
marker evidence is a probability or frequency figure, the criminal
courts will face an unprecedented rise in the introduction of statistical
testimony. Fair trials demand a careful consideration of the proper use
of such statistics. A famous California case, People v. Collins,'" trig-
gered much of the debate surrounding the proper use of statistical evi-
dence in criminal cases.
III. THE PRODUCT RULE
A. People v. Collins
In Collins, an assailant knocked down Juanita Brooks in an alley
near her house and took her purse. John Bass saw a woman flee from
the alley and get into a partly yellow automobile. Bass described the
woman as white, with blonde hair worn in a ponytail. The car was
driven by a black man with a mustache and beard. The victim was not
able to make any identifications, but Bass identified Collins as the
after cited as Gene Frequencies]; Baxter, Grouping of Blood Stains: Present and Future Trends, 12
CAL. W.L. REV. 284, 285-86 (1976).
12. It might be no more probative than proving that both the killer and the defendant were
right-handed or had brown hair.
13. Testimony in one trial indicated that the new blood tests were used by the FBI research
laboratory and over one hundred other forensic labs in this country. State v. Washington, 229
Kan. 47, 52, 622 P.2d 986, 990-91 (1981).
14. This assumes that the courts will admit the testimony based on the scientific tests. I have
argued elsewhere that since the reliability of the forensic applications of these recently developed
procedures has not been proved, such testimony should not now be admitted into criminal trials.
See Jonakait, supra note 5, at 911-12.
15. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
[Vol. 1983
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driver. Collins and his white wife, Janet, were charged with the rob-
bery. Collins was black with a beard and a mustache. Janet had a
blonde ponytail, and the couple drove a partly yellow automobile.
During the jury trial, the defendant attacked the Bass identifica-
tion by attempting to show that at a lineup shortly after the incident
Bass had been unsure of his identification. Furthermore, Collins con-
tended that on the day of the robbery Janet had been wearing clothes
different from those that witnesses had described as being worn by the
woman who took the purse. To shore up what may have been per-
ceived as a weak identification, the prosecutor called as a witness a
college mathematics instructor. The witness first explained the basic
"product rule" of probability, which states that "the probability of the
joint occurrence of a number of mutually independent events is equal to
the product of the individual probabilities that each of the events will
occur."' 6 Thus, the odds of getting a head on a flip of a coin is one in
two or one-half, and the odds of getting two heads on two flips are one
in four, or one-half times one-half. 7
The prosecutor in Collins continued by having the mathematician
apply the product rule to the case at hand. The mathematician as-
sumed probabilities for the individual characteristics which the accused
couple supposedly had in common with a robber couple. Thus, the
chances of a partly yellow automobile was assigned a probability of
1/10; a man with a mustache, 1/4; a woman with a ponytail, 1/10; a
woman with blonde hair, 1/3; a black man with a beard, 1/3; and an
interracial couple in a car, 1/100. Using the product rule, the instructor
multiplied these odds together and concluded that only one couple in
12,000,000 would possess all these characteristics. As the California
Supreme Court concluded, "under this theory, it was to be inferred that
there could be but one chance in 12 million that defendants were inno-
cent and that another equally distinctive couple actually committed the
robbery."'"
The California Supreme Court reversed and held:
[T]he prosecution's introduction and use of mathematical
probability statistics injected two fundamental prejudicial errors
into the case: (1) The testimony itself lacked an adequate founda-
tion both in evidence and in statistical theory; and (2) the testi-
mony and the manner in which the prosecution used it distracted
the jury from its proper and requisite function of weighing the evi-
dence on the issue of guilt, encouraged the jurors to rely upon an
engaging but logically irrelevant expert demonstration, foreclosed
the possibility of an effective defense by an attorney apparently
unschooled in mathematical refinements, and placed the jurors
16. Id at 325, 438 P.2d at 36, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500 (emphasis in original).
17. See Fairley & Moesteller, A Conversation About Collins, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 242, 245
(1974). See also Braun, supra note 2, at 46.
18. 68 Cal. 2d at 325, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
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and defense counsel at a disadvantage in sifting relevant fact from
inapplicable theory.' 9
The court concluded that the statistical technique was inherently
flawed for two reasons. First, the prosecution presented nothing to es-
tablish the probabilities for any of the relevant characteristics; instead,
odds were merely assumed without any attempt to prove what the
probabilities actually were. Thus, the prosecution failed to lay a proper
foundation for the introduction of the probability in figures,2" or, put
another way, "there was no effort by the prosecution to connect the
numbers with the real world.' Second, even if the probabilities of the
characteristics had somehow been accurately computed, the Collins
court further concluded that:
[T]here was another glaring defect in the prosecution's technique,
namely an inadequate proof of the statistical independence of the
six factors. No proof was presented that the characteristics se-
lected were mutually independent, even though the witness him-
self acknowledged that such condition was essential to the proper
application of the "product rule" or "multiplication rule."22
Mutual independence is also called statistical independence:
Statistical independence between X and Y means that it is neither
more nor less likely that Y happens whether or not X happens.
For example, in drawing a card from an ordinary pack of playing
cards, let X mean the card is an ace and Y mean the card is black.
The probability that the card drawn is black (rather than red) is
1/2, whether or not the card is an ace.23
Lack of proof on this issue makes the Collins statistics fundamen-
tally unsound; certainly no reason exists to believe that the characteris-
tics were independent of each other. Even if a study of the population
showed that one woman in four was blonde and one woman in ten had
a ponytail, we cannot necessarily conclude that only one woman in
forty is blonde and wears a ponytail. Perhaps, for some reason,
blondes have more of a penchant for ponytails than women with other
hair colors. And certainly,
19. Id at 327, 438 P.2d at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
20. The California Supreme Court stated:
First, as to the foundation requirement, we find the record devoid of any evidence relating to
any of the six individual probability factors used by the prosecutor and ascribed to him by the
six characteristics. . . . To put it another way, the prosecution produced no evidence whatso-
ever showing, or from which it could be in way inferred, that only one of every ten cars which
might have been at the scene of the robbery was partly yellow. . . or that any of the other
individual probability factors listed were even roughly accurate. . . . A foundation for the
admissibility of the witness' testimony was never even attempted to be laid, let alone
established.
Id at 327-28, 438 P.2d at 38-39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03.
21. Fairley & Moesteller, supra note 17, at 247.
22. 68 Cal. 2d at 328, 438 P.2d at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
23. Fairley & Moesteller, supra note 17, at 244. Braun, supra note 2, at 67 states, "Two or
more events are independent if the probability of the occurrence of one is in no way affected by
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any of the others."
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it must be much more likely that a man has a mustache if he has a
beard than if he does not. Beards and mustaches tend to run to-
gether. And, if you have a "girl with blonde hair" and a "Negro
man with a beard," the chance that you have an "interracial
couple" must be close to 1000 times greater than the estimate of
1/1000.24
Thus, the Collins opinion correctly 25 indicates that the product rule
cannot be applied to identifying characteristics unless a valid founda-
tion is first laid for the probability assigned to each of the characteris-
tics2 6 and unless the mutual independence of each of the characteristics
is established.
B. Genetic Marker Evidence: Independence
The Collins caveats apply to the probability evidence derived from
the analysis of blood genetic markers;27 the product rule cannot be ap-
plied to the marker evidence unless accurate population frequency data
exist and then only if the markers' appearances are statistically in-
dependent of each other. A trial presentation, for example, that blood
found at the crime scene contained type A blood and PGM factor 1-228
and that the blood of the person on trial contained those same two
factors would tell the jury little. Instead, the prosecution would no
doubt also want to give the jury information about the frequency of
PGM 1-2 in the population. An example of the prosecution's showing
would be that 36% of the white population has type A blood and 36%
of the white population has PGM 1-2. The product rule would then be
presented and the conclusion reached that only 13% of the white popu-
lation has both type A and PGM 1-2. As Collins teaches, however, this
conclusion is only supportable if both the elementary percentages are
accurate and the factors are statistically independent.
A 1978 study has made a critical examination of mutual indepen-
dence.2 9 This study typed the ABO system and eleven other markers in
24. Fairly & Moesteller, supra note 17, at 245.
25. Almost everyone who has reviewed the case points out two fundamental problems
with the probability of I in 12 million. The elementary probabilities are of dubious origin
since the frequencies of the six characteristics are not accurately tabulated for any relevant
population and, furthermore, these characteristics are not statistically independent.
Probability, supra note 7, at 28.
26. This probability may also be called a population frequency figure since the probability
denominates how often the characteristic occurs in a relevant population. See supra text accom-
panying note 10.
27. "A first look at Collins thus reveals two requirements for the introduction of statistical
analysis in evidence: the prosecutor must introduce evidence as to the probabilities of the individ-
ual factors and of the relations among them." Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 492.
28. See supra note 9.
29. Grunbaum, Selvin, Pace & Black, Frequency Distribution and Discrimination Probability
of Twelve Protein Genetic Variants in Human Blood as Functions of Race, Sex, and Age, 23 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 577 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Frequency Distribution]. The authors state that they
were seeking to verify that "[t]he phenotypic frequencies are statistically independent . Id
at 579.
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blood samples taken from a large population. The samples were then
evaluated statistically to see if each identified marker was independent
of the others. For practical purposes, the study concluded, these ge-
netic markers were mutually independent.30
Although concluding that the markers were independent of each
other, however, the report found that blood genetic markers are statisti-
cally linked to race or ethnic background. 3' According to this study,
although 35.8% of the white population (males and females of all ages
combined)32 have type A blood, only 25.9% of blacks do, and although
35.6% of the white population has PGM 1-2, only 29.5% of blacks have
that phenotype.33 Thus, 12.7% of the white population has both these
factors, while only 7.6% of blacks do. Consequently, the authors con-
cluded that the difference in phenotypic frequencies means that dis-
crimination probabilities must be computed separately for each ethnic
group.34
This study does establish, however, that for each racial or ethnic
group the phenotypic frequencies are mutually independent. Conse-
quently, for each race the frequency of each genetic factor can be mul-
tiplied by the frequency of each of the other phenotypes. The resulting
product indicates the frequency of the joint appearance of those genetic
blood markers in the population by race or ethnic group. For instance,
if 36% of the white population has type A blood and 36% of that popu-
30. [I]t may be concluded that these . . . genetic variants behave statistically indepen-
dently. The group specific component (Gc) showed significant association in five situations.
The Gc system is associated with erythrocyte acid phosphatase (EAP) systems for both whites
and Chicano/Amerindians, the ABO system in Chicano/Amerindians, and the PGD [6-
Phosphogluconate dehydrogenasel system in both blacks and Asians. Nevertheless, the con-
tingency coeffficients are rather small and no substantial error would be incurred by assuming
the Gc system to be statistically independent from the other eleven systems investigated.
Id at 583-84.
31. The genetic marker determinations are made separately for four ethnic groups denomi-
nated white, black, Chicano/Amerindian, and Asian. The report concluded, "Some variants
showed sizable differences in phenotypic frequencies among the four ethnic groups. . . and other
frequencies show less notable differences . . . . Nevertheless, all differences were highly statisti-
cally significant . . . for the twelve genetic variants." Id at 581. The connection between ethnic
groups and genetic markers has been noted by many investigators. See the studies collected in A.
MOURANT, A. KOPEC & K. DOMANIEWSKA-SOBCZAK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE HUMAN BLOOD
GROUPS AND OTHER POLYMORPHISMS (1976). See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATIS-
TICS, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SELECTED
GENETIC MARKERS OF BLOOD AND SECRETIONS FOR YOUTHS, 12-17 YEARS OF AGE: UNITED
STATES (1980) (hereinafter cited as PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE].
32. This study concluded that there was no correlation between the age of the blood donor
and the genetic markers. See Frequency Distribution, supra note 29, at 581. The study also con-
cluded that no correlation between sex anJ the phenotypes occurred except for one genetic marker
system. "[G]lucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G-6-PD) is a sex-linked variant and is expected
to have different phenotypic frequencies between males and females . Id. at 580.
33. Id at 582, table 7.
34. Id at 583. The discrimination probability is a different probability than the frequency
figure which states what percentage of the population has a specific set of phenotypes. Instead, the
discrimination probability is the probability that two randomly selected people will have the same
phenotypes. Id at 577. The discrimination probability requires, as does the product rule, that the
phenotypic frequencies be statistically independent. Id at 579.
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lation has PGM factor 1-2, the two percentages can be multiplied to-
gether to reach the conclusion that 13% of whites will have both those
factors. Putting it another way, a 13% chance exists that randomly se-
lected persons from the white population will have type A and PGM I -
2.3
5
As Collins indicates, however, this final percentage is correct only
if the initial percentages are accurate. Thus, to use the product rule in
this way, one must first know exactly what percentages of the popula-
tion have type A blood and PGM 1-2.
C Genetic Marker Evidence- Frequency Data
Since the discovery of polymorphism in blood, many studies have
catalogued the frequencies of genetic markers in various ethnic and ra-
cial groups throughout the world.36 Even so, the data collected for the
United States have been of questionable reliability; most of the samples
have come from nonrandom sources and therefore might not truly re-
flect the population as a whole. As recently as 1980, a survey of this
literature by the United States Public Health Service reported:
Since E.B. Ford first defined the term "polymorphism," there has
been a growing recognition of the existence of numerous
polymorphic genetic markers. . . . The differences in frequencies
observed in various racial groups and geographic areas have been
published in volumes of tables and individual reports. These fre-
quencies have been based on evaluations of numerous groups
from various countries. However, very few samples have been
random or systematic, and none have been systematic representa-
tive samples of the U.S. population.37
This 1980 survey reported that even for the most studied of the genetic
markers, the ABO system, no data based on a representative sample
from the U.S. as a whole or even any one region had been compiled.
Instead, the best frequency tabulations were from "a conglomeration of
small samples from heterogeneous sources, some dating as far back as
1907." 38
The reliability of such statistics is open to question for several rea-
sons. The authors noted:
The importance of current-based statistics cannot be overempha-
sized. In addition to the fact that blood typing techniques were
not as accurate in some of the early studies as they are today, [two
35. "mhe probability that a randomly chosen individual of given ethnic group possesses the
same blood phenotypes as found in a predetermined sample of blood. . . is simply the product of
the phenotypic frequencies of the phenotypes considered in the predetermined sample. ... Id
at 586.
36. The most complete collection of such studies is in A. MouRANT, A. KOPEC & K.
DoMANtEWSKA-SOBCZAK, suprO note 31.
37. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 31, at 2.
38. Id at 3.
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researchers] found secular differences reaching statistical signifi-
cance in samples taken in the same hospital in Iowa over 17 differ-
ent years. In another study of blood group frequencies of donors
from two different donor organizations in the same city during the
same time period (Baltimore, July-August 1963), the two samples
yielded significantly different distributions 
for white donors. 39
Frequency statistics for other genetic markers present even more
problems because often the only samplings have been from limited
populations. "The blood frequency data on many other blood compo-
nents depend on statistics from the British population, Norwegian sam-
ples, Milwaukee blacks . . . , or Seattle donors . . , representing the
'best' statistics available."'  Moreover, the figures often have been
compiled from blood donors. The randomness of such samplings is
questionable.4' As recently as 1980 the Public Health Service
concluded:
In summary, although some genetic markers systems have been
known for longer than 75 years . . . no reliable frequency data
exist on population samples for the U.S. population as a whole, for
various U.S. geographic regions, or for sub-classifications by age
or sex. Many frequencies reported are derived from blood donor
samples that often are not representative of the total population
42
The Public Health Service unsuccessfully tried to rectify these
flaws by determining the frequencies of genetic markers from a fair
sampling of the United States population. These markers were ana-
lyzed in the blood taken from "a proportionately representative sample
of non-institutionalized youths aged 12-17 years in the U.S. popula-
tion."43 This study, however, has a major limitation for forensic pur-
poses: only a few genetic markers were typed. Such markers as EAP
and PGM, which have been used in some criminal cases," were not
identified by the Public Health Service. Thus, the questions remain
about the reliability of the population frequency figures for many of the
important genetic marker systems.45
One group of researchers, however, recently has set out to amass
the necessary information so that forensic scientists can derive valid
39. Id at 4.
40. Id
41. "Although donor samples have often been used for obtaining 'population frequencies,'
especially in Great Britain and other European countries, for the United States the representative-
ness of such samples is open to question." Id
42. Id
43. Id at 1.
44. For example, EAP was typed in State v. Hampton, 294 N.C. 242, 239 S.E.2d 835 (1978);
PGM was typed in People v. Stephens, 81 Cal. App. 3d 744, 146 Cal. Rptr. 748 (2d Dist. 1978).
45. The blood genetic marker systems typed by the Public Health Service were the ABO
system, the Rhesus (Rh) system, transferrin haptoglobin, and group specific component. PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 31, at 2.
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probabilities from the genetic markers.4 6 This group, lead by Benjamin
W. Grunbaum and operating under a grant from the California Office
of Criminal Justice Planning, has undertaken "a large-scale study...
to establish statistical data of a number of genetic variants in human
blood."47
Although the two resulting studies are large-scale, they are still
subject to some of the criticisms levied by the Public Health Service at
earlier works. The samples were collected from blood donors in Cali-
fornia only. These researchers realized, however, that such a collection
procedure was not enough to ensure a sufficient number of donors from
certain ethnic groups. Consequently, the group obtained Asian sam-
ples from the Blood Bank of Hawaii and Mexican samples from the
Banco Central de Sangre of Mexico City. Because of these additional
sources, the researchers concluded, "The data were collected so that
adequate numbers of individuals were present for four ethnic groups
(white, black, Mexican, and Asian)."48 The group went on to note that
the compiled data could apply strictly to the studied population only,
but the study concluded that, in a practical sense, the information could
be applied nationally:
[I]t is likely that these results generalize to most of the United
States population with minor variation. The minor variation
stems from the fact that samples from other parts of the United
States may have phenotypic frequencies that are slightly different
for the four major California-Hawaii groups.49
If this conclusion is correct, then the Grunbaum group's figures
should correspond to the Public Health Service data for the genetic
markers that both studies typed. Such a comparison indicates that the
two sets of frequencies are in general agreement, suggesting that the
Grunbaum group's data need not be limited to the specific populations
sampled.
Two caveats, however, are essential. First, the frequencies com-
piled by each study are seldom, if ever, the same. Thus, the Public
Health Service indicates that 51.9% of the white population has Gc Sys-
46. These researchers noted:
Civil and criminal investigations often employ analysis of human blood group data as a tool
for identification. When two blood samples compared for identification do not match, the
innocence of an accused person is established. When two compared samples match, the ac-
cused person is not eliminated from suspicion on the basis of blood analysis. In this case,
mathematical probabilities are the best method available to assess the likelihood associated
with the failure of genetic evidence to give a conclusive answer. The calculation of the
probabilities depends on accurate knowledge of the phenotypic or gene frequencies of the
genetic variants being compared. . . . A prerequisite for useful probabilities is reliable esti-
mates of the phenotypic and gene frequencies from specific populations.
Gene Frequencies, supra note 11, at 428-29.
47. Frequency Distribution, supra note 29, at 579.
48. Gene Frequencies, supra note 1I, at 429.
49. Frequency Distribution, supra note 29, at 585.
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tem factor 1-1,50 while in the two Grunbaum group's studies that same
frequency is listed at 50.2% 11 and 51.1%. 2 This indicates that none of
the figures can be considered as the precise population frequency; in-
stead, each should be treated as a reasonably accurate approximation.
This variance is important to the application of the product rule. If a
die is accurately constructed, the chances of rolling a "2" on any toss is
precisely one in six, and therefore the product rule states that the
chances of tossing two consecutive "2's" is exactly one in thirty-six.
However, if two genetic markers are identified in a blood sample, and a
frequency table indicates that each factor appears in 40% of the popula-
tion, it would not be correct to conclude that precisely 16% of the popu-
lation had both factors. Instead that resulting product should be
treated only as a good approximation of the combined frequency of the
two factors. Such a resulting product must be treated with special cau-
tion when only a few markers have been identified. For example, if we
think of the 40% figure for each of two identified markers as an approx-
imation which more accurately indicates that the true frequency lies in
a range between 35% and 45%, then the frequency for the two markers
in combination is between .35 x .35, or 12.2% and .45 x .45, or 20%.
That eight percentage point range could, of course, be significant. The
problem resulting from the approximate nature of the frequency
figures, however, lessens as the number of genetic markers identified in
a blood sample increases. For instance, assume six markers are identi-
fied, each with a supposed frequency of 40%, which truly indicates a
range from 35% to 45%. The resulting products would indicate the
combined frequency lay between .356 and .456, or from 0.2% to 0.8%, or
a range slightly over half a percentage point.
The second caveat concerns rare phenotypes. Although different
population surveys may each give a frequency figure within a percent-
age point of the other, if the frequency is rare enough the magnitude of
difference between the frequencies given may be very large. Thus, the
Public Health Service reported that in whites, rare phenotypes of the
Gc system occur in 0.1% of the population. 3 Grunbaum's group, how-
ever, reported 0.4%14 and 0.9%."1 Thus, although the given frequencies
are all within a percentage point, Grunbaum's group indicates that this
rare phenotype occurs four to nine times as often as that reported by
the Public Health Service. Of course, any product involving the rare
phenotype figures will vary up to nine-fold depending upon which
figure is selected. Once again, the problem does not seem acute if a
large number of markers are identified. For example, if six markers are
50. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 31, at 25 fig. 9. See also supra note 30.
51. Frequency Distribution,supra note 29, at 583 table 7.
52. See Gene Frequencies, supra note 11, at 433 table 3.
53. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 31, at 26.
54. Frequency Distribution, supra note 29, at 583 table 7.
55. See Gene Frequencies, supra note 11, at 433 table 3.
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found, one being the rare one with a frequency between 0.1% to 0.9%,
and the other five with frequencies of 40%, the probability of all six
appearing in conjunction ranges from 0.001% to 0.009%. Either per-
centage is so small that each is likely to have the same effect on a trier
of fact. However, if only the rare phenotype and one other marker
with a 40% frequency are identified, the resulting products indicate that
the combination occurs either thirty-six times in 1000 or four times in
1000. Those additional twenty-two people might well make a differ-
ence to a juror.
Available research thus indicates that population frequency figures
cannot be treated as precise and that great care must be taken in the
interpretation of the products using the frequencies. This is especially
true when only a handful of markers is identified, or if one of the mark-
ers is a rare phenotype. Nevertheless, data now exist which form a
reasonable basis on which to ascribe genetic marker frequencies. The
situation, therefore, is not like Collins. The probabilities are not fanci-
ful creations; instead they have a foundation in the real world and may
be verified scientifically. Because blood genetic markers are statisti-
cally independent from each other, the criticisms about the use of the
product rule as in Collins do not apply. Consequently, a valid
probability can be computed for the joint occurrence of genetic mark-
ers by simply multiplying the individual frequencies together. 56
D. Genetic Marker Evidence and the Product Rule in the Courts
Although computing probabilities from genetic marker phenotyp-
ing now has a solid basis, the courts which have admitted such testi-
mony have shown little concern for checking this foundation. In fact,
even though some of the trials admitting such evidence were held prior
to the publication of the data compiled by the Public Health Service
and the Grunbaum group, no case discussed whether the various mark-
ers are mutually independent and only a few decisions indicate the
sources of the frequency figures.57 Indeed, the courts generally are un-
56. Thus, one study concerned with the probabilities derived from genetic marker evidence
has summarized:
The same issues debated in the case of the People versus Collins arise when blood found at
the scene of a crime matches the blood of a defendant. However, evidence from the analysis
of blood group systems provides an opportunity to employ valid probabilistic arguments in
criminal identification. Blood group genetic variants often have well defined frequencies and
are distributed in a statistically independent manner. These two properties, lacking in the
Collins case, make it possible to calculate useful quantitative measures of the strength of
genetically derived circumstantial evidence.
Probability, supra note 7, at 28.
57. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 308 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1981); State v. Fulton, 299 N.C. 491,
263 S.E.2d 608 (1980); State v. Hampton, 294 N.C. 242, 239 S.E.2d 835 (1978). See also People v.
Bush, 103 Ill. App. 3d 5, 430 N.E.2d 514 (1981). There the defendant challenged the admission of
the genetic marker evidence, but the appellate court was unsure of the precise basis of the attack.
The court stated, "Defendant also asserts that this evidence was inadmissible for failure to lay a
proper foundation, although the specific nature of this argument is not clear." Id at 13, 43 N.E.2d
at 520. The court concluded that the defendant was attacking the scientific tests, not the statistics.
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aware of the lessons of Collins. In one case, however, the reviewing
court at least partially delved into the foundation for the statistics
presented at trial.
In State v. Rolls,58 a Maine case, a bloodstain on the defendant's
pants was analyzed and the ABO, EAP, and PGM factors were classi-
fied. The FBI agent who did the analysis testified:
that approximately 35% of the Caucasian population of the United
States possesses type A' blood in the ABO classification, that stud-
ies done by Scotland Yard reported that approximately 37% of
those studied possessed type 2-1 in the PGM group, and that re-
search done at the FBI laboratory showed that approximately 39%
of the population possesses the EAP characteristic BA.59
The agent then went on to describe the product rule and concluded that
"approximately 5% of the population, or one person in twenty, would
possess all three blood characteristics which the victim possessed and
which were present in the bloodstain on the defendant's pants."6 °
The defendant attacked the resulting conclusion, contending that
there was an "insufficient foundation to support admission of this testi-
mony because the witness based his opinion on hearsay about the per-
centage of the population possessing each of the three blood grouping
characteristics in issue."' 61 Holding that Maine Rule of Evidence 703
controlled, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated that the eviden-
tiary ruling was primarily a matter for the trial court's discretion.62
The trial judge was not bound by the expert's assertions that the under-
lying data generally are regarded as reliable. The court also held that it
was insufficient for an expert merely to show that he relies on such data
for the preparation of his testimony. The data must be the sort relied
upon by experts for purposes other than testifying.63
The Public Health Service study indicates that experts would not
have accepted the data as reliable. At the time of the Rolls opinion no
published study contained a representative sampling of the genetic
markers in any section of the United States or for the country as a
whole. Clearly, the Scotland Yard figures would not meet the objec-
tions listed by the Public Health Service since that data could not be
representative of this country. In addition, no information was pro-
vided on how the British or the FBI frequency figures were compiled.
Because nothing indicates that the FBI expert's statistics contained a
58. 389 A.2d 824 (Me. 1978).
59. Id at 827.
60. Id
61. Id at 829.
62. Id The court stated that the rule provides: "The facts or data in the particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to
him at or before the hearing. Ifofa type reasonably relied upon by experts in theparicular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, thefacts or data need not be admissible in evidence."
Id (emphasis added by the court).
63. Id at 829-30.
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fair sampling of the United States population, and certainly not of
Maine, the experts in this field, at least as indicated by the Public
Health Service, would have regarded the statistics as unreliable.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the ad-
mission of the statistical evidence:
Before admitting the witness' testimony, the presiding justice
heard evidence from which he could have found as a preliminary
fact that the blood grouping surveys from which Agent Spalding
drew were of a type which were reasonably relied upon by those in
the field. On this record, we are unable to say that there was no
proper foundation to support admission of Agent Spalding's
testimony.
The Defendant's objection to this testimony was more prop-
erly directed to its weight rather than its admissibility. 4
Other cases have also relied on figures compiled by law enforce-
ment agencies.65 Of course, if these statistics have not been collected
from a random sample of a relevant population, the derived probabili-
ties can be challenged. Reliance on the law enforcement compilations
present additional concerns, however. First, nothing indicates that
such data have been published. Without publication, the scientific
community will not have had the opportunity to analyze the study's
methods or results. Thus, the reliability of this information will not
have been examined by those who are most qualified to do so.
Second, the ability of police forensic labs to do accurate phenotyp-
ing is doubtful. In 1979 several persons raised a concern about the
reliability of drug testing in those facilities. Responding to these con-
cerns, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration sponsored a
broad and systematic test of the proficiency of American crime labora-
tories. Crime laboratories from throughout the United States partici-
pated in the program. The results of these tests were disconcerting: "It
is an understatement to say that the findings of the Test Program are
alarming. 'Shocking' would be more precise."66 In blood analysis test-
ing the report indicated that of the 132 laboratories which responded,
ninety-four gave "unacceptable" responses. This represents an "unac-
64. Id at 830 (citations and footnotes omitted).
65. For example, in People v. Young, 106 Mich. App. 323, 308 N.W.2d 194 (1981), the state's
expert who worked for the Michigan State Police, testified that the use of the product rule was
based upon population frequencies compiled from a research project directed by the witness
involving 1,000 persons in the Detroit area for the purpose of determining the frequency that
certain blood factors would be found in the general population. The results were checked
internally for their statistical significance and were also compared to figures that had been
established in other parts of the United States and around the world.
Id at 326, 308 N.W.2d at 195. In State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978), the probabilities
were derived from statistics collected by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension "which
were in turn correlated with national and international blood-type records." Id at 172 n.2.
66. Imwinkelried, ,4 New Era in the Evolution ofScientiqc Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating
the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 268 (1981).
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ceptable" rate of 71.2%.67
This discussion about the product rule and genetic marker evi-
dence reveals two important points. First, even though the admission
of such statistical evidence in past cases may have been subject to chal-
lenge both because the necessary mutual independence had not been
demonstrated and because the data underlying the frequency products
did not accurately represent a relevant population,6" the courts admit-
ted this evidence without consideration of these concerns. Courts and
litigators appear unaware of even the basic lessons of Collins and of.
elementary statistical requirements. Second, as we have seen, research-
ers now have established that genetic blood markers do appear inde-
pendently from each other. Furthermore, phenotypic frequencies
adequately grounded in the real world have been compiled. Thus, the
two glaring flaws present in Collins are absent in this newly developed
forensic evidence. The product rule can be applied in the future to the
individual marker frequencies with a statistically valid result. Thus, if
three markers are identified in a blood sample, and the frequency data
indicate that each occurs in 10% of the population, it is correct to con-
clude that the combination of those markers appears at a rate of one
person in every thousand.
This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. A question
much harder to resolve must now be faced. Granted that a statistically
acceptable product can be generated by genetic marker phenotyping,
what is the proper use of this product, this probability, this frequency,
in a criminal case?
IV. APPLICATION AND MISAPPLICATION OF FREQUENCY
EVIDENCE-THE SUBCLASS
A hypothetical situation will be useful in judging the proper uses
of the frequency evidence.69 Assume a New York City lawyer is found
slain in the stairwell of the top floor of her Wall Street office building.
The medical examiner concludes that she was killed by a .32 caliber
bullet and died almost instantly with death put at 4:00 p.m. on a
67. Id at 269.
68. Even if reasons existed to exclude the statistics from some earlier cases, nothing indicates
that the defendants were harmed by their admission. Thus, in State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824, 827
(Me. 1978), the expert testified that approximately 5% of the population had the combined mark-
ers of ABO type A, EAP type BA, and PGM 2-1. The 1980 figures compiled in Gene Distribution,
supra note I1, at 432-34 table 3, indicate a joint frequency for those phenotypes of 4.7% of the
white population and 2.2% of the black population. (Type A blood consists of two variations, type
A1 and type A2.) The 1978 study in Frequency Dirtribution, supra note 29, at 582-83 table 7, only
reported the results as type A without giving separate frequencies for the two major subgroups.
See Jonakait, supra note 5, at 836, n.12. In People v. Young, 106 Mich. App. 323, 308 N.W.2d 194
(1981) and State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978), the courts did not state what pheno-
types were identified in the blood samples so it is not possible to compare the frequencies
presented in those cases with a product derived from the Grunbaum group figures.
69. This is an adaptation of Finkelstein and Fairley's hypothetical. See Finkelstein & Fair-
ley, supra note 2, at 496-97.
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Wednesday. Her purse is missing. Some of her clothes are in disarray
and other signs of a struggle are evident. Near her body is found a
penknife she was known to carry. Dried blood found on the knife is
examined for genetic markers. Police determine that the victim has dif-
ferent phenotypes than that found in the dried blood. Using frequency
tables and the product rule, investigators conclude that the combina-
tion of the identified markers occurs at the rate of one person in every
1000.
The police interview most of the 400 employees of the firm. No
one saw the victim enter the stairwell or saw anything suspicious on the
four floors occupied by the victim's law firm. The police learn that the
victim had a boyfriend and obtained a picture of him. The elevator
operator for the building tells the police that he saw the boyfriend leave
the building at about 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. on the day of the murder.
The police investigate further and find out the relationship be-
tween the boyfriend and the victim was stormy. When the police go to
the boyfriend's apartment, the landlord tells them that the boyfriend,
on the night of the murder, paid the landlord an extra month's rent in
advance, asked him to keep an eye on the apartment, and told the land-
lord that he was not sure when he would be returning.
A month later, the police find the boyfriend in Chicago and bring
him back to New York. His blood is analyzed and found to contain the
same genetic markers as the blood on the knife. He is charged with
murder and put on trial.
The prosecutor introduces expert testimony about the blood analy-
sis and seeks to present to the jury the frequency data, to have a statisti-
cal expert explain the product rule, and to present to the jury the
conclusion that only 0.1% of the population has blood containing the
identified genetic markers. The defendant objects to this statistical
presentation claiming that whatever slight probative value this evi-
dence may have is outweighed by the prejudicial impact that the figures
will have on the jury.
Certainly the frequency conclusion could be expected to have im-
pact on the jury. Without the statistical data, the prosecution probably
can not produce enough evidence to convince a jury that guilt has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt. With the statistics, however,
the jury probably would convict.7°
A. Probative Value of Frequency Evidence
The use of the genetic marker evidence in this hypothetical neces-
sitates two conclusions. First, the dried blood was not that of the vic-
70. See id at 497 (the authors conclude about their hypothetical, "Without the print evi-
dence [which was limited so that the expert could only conclude that such prints appear in no
more than one case in a thousand] the case probably does not go to the jury. With it the jury
probably convicts.").
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tim. Second, the blood could have come from the defendant; the
genetic analysis does not exclude the possibility that he was the source
of the blood.7 ' These conclusions, however, are clear from the genetic
analysis without reference to the frequency computation.
A much harder issue is what weight should be given to the similar-
ity between the dried blood and the defendant's blood and the statistics
indicating that these characteristics occur in only one out of every thou-
sand people. One possible conclusion from this figure is that there is
only one chance in a thousand that the blood came from someone other
than the defendant. If the evidence is taken that way, which the aver-
age juror might be inclined to do, the statistical presentation will be
taken as strong evidence of guilt. The juror would then conclude that
science has established that it is 99.9% certain that the defendant's
blood was found at the scene.
Such reasoning, however, would be a gross misinterpretation of
the statistics. The frequency figure does not give the odds that it was
the defendant's blood at the scene. Instead, the figure states that out of
every thousand people who might have committed the crime, only one,
on average, has blood with the identified characteristics; or stating the
same thing, out of every 100,000 people who might have been at the
crime scene, only 100 have blood with the same genetic factors found
on the knife. Viewed this way, the statistic is not a probability indicat-
ing defendant's guilt; instead, it is merely a measure of the number of
people who might have left their blood at the murder scene. Con-
versely, these figures indicate how much of the population can be ex-
cluded from consideration. Thus, the statistic allows a way to calculate
the number of people in a shortened list of suspects, one of whom is the
defendant.
The same statistical problems are presented whenever the evidence
produces such a probability. Neutron activation analysis (NAA) gives
another example. NAA technology allows identification of the basic
chemical elements present in a material sample. In one case, blue
specks of paint found on a tire tool used to commit a crime were sub-
71. Some commentators have stressed that blood grouping in criminal cases can only prove a
negative. For example, "Again, it must be emphasized that these results have solely a negative
value--the tests can only prove that the sample is not the blood of the suspect." Sussman, Supple-
mentary Applications in PATERNITY TESTING BY BLOOD GROUPING 153 (L. Sussman ed. 1976).
Before discussing the various tests and analysis of blood specimens one point must be
made perfectly clear. Blood as evidence is what is referred to as a negative-positive. No
statement can be made that two blood samples are identical, but the serologist can state at
times that two blood specimens are not identical. For example, if the blood on the clothing of
a suspect is of group A and the blood group of the victim is also group A, the only positive
statement that the serologist can validly make is that both bloods are of the same blood group.
He cannot state that the two specimens came from the same origin. However, if the blood on
the clothing of the suspect is group B and that of the victim is group A, the serologist may
then state that the blood on the suspect's clothing could not have come from the victim.
MOENSSENS & INBAU, supra note 3, § 6.09, at 293 (emphasis in original). See also Annot., 2
A.L.R. 4th 500, 506 (1980).
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mitted to neutron activation analysis.72 The analysis identified five ele-
ments in the paint. These elements also were found in the same
concentrations in the blue paint on defendant's car. The expert also
testified that other tests in his laboratory had shown that:
[Tiwo similar-type paints of similar color but of different brands
would contain a given element in concentrations within 10 percent
of each other only about one time in five. If one assumes that the
chance of finding a given amount of one element is independent of
the amounts of any other elements present, then the chance that
similar-type paints of similar color but of different brands will
match concentrations with 10 percent in each of five elements is
(1/5) 5-- one chance in 3,125 or 0.03 percent.73
One commentator analyzed the probative value of this frequency
figure:
The light-blue paint comparison indicates that if 10,000 light
blue cars which are painted with a brand of paint different from
that of the defendant's car are chosen at random, then only three
of them will be found to match the paint on defendant's car within
10 percent in all five elements. If this were the only consideration,
and if it could be shown that far fewer than 10,000 light-blue cars,
all painted with brands of paint different from that used on de-
fendant's car, could conceivably have been the supplier of the tire
tool, then the evidence against the defendant is quite powerful.
On the other hand, if more than 10,000 light-blue cars might have
been involved, there are three in each 10,000 that would give the
same activation analysis results when compared with the specks on
the tire tool as the defendant's car did.
There is a much more important consideration, however.
Even if the activation analysis could positively identify the brand
of paint, that is, even if it were 100 percent certain that the speck of
paint on the tire tool were of the same brand as the paint on de-
fendant's car, the NAA evidence in itself still does no more than
reduce the number of possible culprits to those owning or some-
how associated with light-blue cars painted with that brand of
paint. Therefore, the NAA evidence only points up the defendant
as being a member of a restricted subclass of the general popula-
tion. That the defendant is singled out only as a member of a
restricted subclass is a typical result of NAA evidence, although the
size of the subclass varies greatly with the type of thing being com-
pared. Before the NAA evidence can be meaningfully evaluated,
it is necessary in each case to determine the size of the subclass.74
The same conclusion holds true for the genetic marker evidence.
72. People v. Woodward, No. 108551 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County, July 7, 1964).
73. Note, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analsis, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1015
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Evidentiary Uses].
74. Id at 1016.
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The blood analysis in our hypothetical merely indicates that the de-
fendant is a member of a restricted subclass of the population and other
evidence indicates that a member of that restricted subclass was at the
crime scene. If the population from which the killer would come were
small, say 1,000 persons, then the genetic frequency evidence would
indicate overwhelming odds that only a few people were in the re-
stricted subclass of people with the identified genetic markers. Since
defendant is one of those people, the blood analysis and the statistical
conclusions drawn from it would be powerful evidence of guilt. On the
other hand, if the suspect population were as large as 100,000 persons
then the restricted subclass could be expected to have about 100 mem-
bers, of whom the defendant is one. Since the genetic analysis does not
indicate that any one person in the subclass is more likely to be guilty
than any other person in the subclass, the blood analysis would only
lead to the conclusion that there is one chance in a hundred that the
defendant is guilty." This approach then
makes the number of suspects critical. Determining this number,
however, will usually involve wholly arbitrary decisions. Shall it
include only those in the same neighborhood, the same city, state,
or the entire country? The jury might be given a range of choices
and the probability associated with each choice, but jurors cannot
rationally choose when, as is usual, there is no evidence bearing on
this issue.76
Who, then, should be included in the suspect population for the
hypothetical murder? The answer given by a noted scholar is "the ap-
proximate number of people who had the opportunity to commit the
offense and lack a satisfactory alibi."' 77 Who in our hypothetical fits
that definition? Perhaps the answer is anyone in the stairwell with the
victim at the time of the killing. Of course, if we knew or could ascer-
tain that information, we would seem to know the killer already. In-
stead, perhaps the suspect population includes anyone on the victim's
75. See George, Use and Misuse of Scienftc Evidence in SCIENTIFIC & EXPERT EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL ADVOCACY 10 (J. Cederbaums & E. Arnold eds. 1975) ("It is also necessary to inquire
into the size of the population which is correctly brought within the class to be identified. If the
defendant falls within a very small group, then the scientific evidence increases significantly the
weight of the circumstantial evidence against him. However, if the population sample is very
large, the scientific evidence has little or no relevancy.").
76. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 495. See also Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). In discussing Finkelstein and
Fairley's hypothetical Professor Tribe states:
By itself, of course, the "one-in-a-thousand" statistic is not a very meaningful one. It
does not, as the California Supreme Court in Collins showed, measure the probability of the
defendant's innocence-although many jurors would be hard-pressed to understand why not.
As Finkelstein and Fairley recognize, even if there were as few as one hundred thousand
potential suspects, one would expect approximately one hundred persons to have such prints;
if there were a million potential suspects, one would expect to find a thousand or so similar
prints. Thus the palm print would hardly pinpoint the defendant in any unique way.
Id at 1355.
77. Williams, The Mathematics ofProof, 1979 CIuM. L. REV. 297, 351 n.7.
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floor near the time of death since all of them had the opportunity to kill
her. The suspect population might then be 100 people. However, the
killer may have gone up or down the stairway and never appeared on
the floor of the killing; then perhaps the list of suspects should include
anyone in the building near the time of death, say 5,000 people. Then
again, it would have taken only a few minutes for anyone working in
the Wall Street area to leave their employment and go to the crime
scene. All of these people also had the opportunity. Of course, no rea-
son exists for limiting the possibilities of people within a few minutes of
the crime scene. If instead, all those within an hour's travel time from
the crime scene are considered to have had the opportunity, there
might be as many as ten or fifteen million in this group. And, with jet
travel, there is really no logical reason to limit the notion of opportu-
nity to the thirty miles or so that surround Wall Street. The only way
to place any upper limit on the suspect population is by making as-
sumptions or arbitrary choices. Of course, this gets us back to one of
the problems of Collins; statistics should not be introduced into a crimi-
nal trial when based on unproven assumptions. The limitation on the
suspect population requires exactly that.
Furthermore, even if it is reasonably concluded that the killer
must have lived or worked at the time of the killing within an hour's
travel of Wall Street, and census figures tell the trier of fact how many
people are within this location, at least some of those people would be
infants or invalids or have completely verifiable alibis. Therefore, none
of these people could be the killer. The calculation of the number to be
weeded out from the suspect populations is completely indeterminable;
it could only be made by arbitrary choice which also once again leads
to the problem identified in Collins.
Finally, even if a reasonable upper limit on potential suspects
could be ascertained and if that number could be winnowed down to
eliminate people who could not have done the killing, the number left
would still be so enormous that the statistic would have little probative
value. Assume only 5,000,000 people are on the potential suspect list,
and that eighty percent could establish that they could not have done
the crime. Then 1,000,000 people are still in the suspect population.
Now apply the frequency evidence to this population. The number of
this suspect population must be multiplied by the frequency of the
combined genetic markers, one in 1,000 or .001. This calculation indi-
cates that the blood of any one of 1,000 people could have been left at
the scene.
Thus, even if assumptions allow us to limit the suspect population
as much as has been done here, the genetic evidence that indicated that
defendant has blood like that found at the scene and that only one
person in 1,000 has such blood only means that defendant is one of
1000 people who could have committed the crime. Put another way,
No. 21
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
the blood evidence only proves that there is a 1/1,000 chance defend-
ant's blood was at the scene.
B. Prejudicial Impact
If the jury truly understood that the frequency figure merely helps
to define a subclass of suspects, most always quite large, then a defend-
ant would not be harmed by the introduction of the frequency figure.
Looked at this way, the statistics only lead a very small way towards
the prosecutor's goal of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If, on the
other hand, the jury misunderstands and believes that the frequency
data is an indicator of the probability of guilt or the probability that the
defendant was at the scene then the jury would view this testimony as
strong evidence against the defendant when in fact it is not. In such a
circumstance, the probative value of the evidence would in fact be
greatly outweighed by its prejudicial impact.78
The potential for misuse of frequency or probability evidence is
demonstrated by one of the neutron activation analysis cases. As dis-
cussed above, paint chips were submitted to NAA and probabilities
were derived as to how frequently that composition of paint would ap-
pear in other brands. Even though only a frequency was reported by
the expert,
Time magazine reported the expert witness to have testified that it
was "99.98% [sic] certain" that the tire iron came from Wood-
ward's car and "99.999% certain" that it was used to jimmy the
door. If the witness actually said this, it should be clear that his
testimony was totally unfounded and highly prejudicial, because
the NAA measurement was not capable of singling out the defend-
ant so unambiguously. In any event, that the reporter for Time
thought the expert said this lends credence to a belief that the jury
might have thought so also. Therefore, it is doubtful that the cor-
rect interpretation of the evidence was made clear to the jury.7 9
C. Judicial Response
Because the potential is great that juries will misuse the genetic
marker frequency evidence, an instruction about the limited probative
value of that probability would seem appropriate. No such case has
been reported.
Likewise, no case has been reported in which the frequencies gen-
erated by the new blood tests have been refused admission because
they are too prejudicial. A number of defendants have presented this
argument by citing a New York case, People v. Robinson . An Illinois
court summarized such a challenge to the blood grouping statistics:
78. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1864, at 643 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976).
79. Evidendary Uses, supra note 73, at 1018.
80. 27 N.Y.2d 864, 265 N.E.2d 543, 317 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1970).
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"Defendant relies on the so-called New York rule which states that
such evidence is inadmissible because it lacks probative value in that a
large proportion of the population will have the same blood type.""8
Robinson did not involve the recently developed genetic marker
tests. There the defendant was convicted of murder. The prosecution
proved that the blood type of the semen found in and on the body of
the victim was the same as the defendant's blood type. The New York
Court of Appeals indicated that this evidence should not have been
admitted:
Proof that defendant had type "A" blood and that the semen
found in and on the body of the decedent was derived from a man
with type "A" blood was of no probative value in the case against
defendant in view of the large proportion of the general popula-
tion having blood of this type, and therefore, should not have been
admitted. 82
The New York case is distinguishable from other situations in-
volving the more sophisticated procedures. First, the development of
the genetic marker tests allows the blood sample to be linked with a
much smaller proportion of the population than was done merely with
ABO typing. As that percentage gets smaller, the probative worth of
the evidence would appear to increase. Perhaps it therefore can be ar-
gued that while the evidence in Robinson had little value, that situation
has now changed. Second, nothing in the New York opinion indicates
that the jury was presented the frequency figure for the appearance of
this sort of blood in the population. If that number is presented it can
be argued that the jurors can correctly assess for themselves the proper
probative value of the evidence.
In any event, this New York approach has been widely rejected.83
As a Michigan court said, "[t]he overwhelming majority of courts allow
the use of blood grouping evidence in criminal trials, both to connect
victims with defendants and, of interest here, to show that defendants
could have left blood stains on crime scenes."84 Uniformly, the courts
have concluded that the statistics derived from the recently developed
genetic marker tests were validly admitted and that arguments about
81. People v. Bush, 103 Ill. App. 3d 5, 13, 430 N.E.2d 514, 520 (1982).
82. Robinson, 27 N.Y.2d at 865, 265 N.E.2d at 543, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20. See also People
v. Macedonio, 42 N.Y.2d 944, 366 N.E.2d 1355, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1977).
83. Indeed, New York itself seems ready to abandon this rule. Recently the New York
Court of Appeals has held that the District Attorney could get an order requiring a blood sample
from a potential murder suspect who had not yet been charged. Blood was found at the murder
scene which was not the victim's and such blood was found at a rate of less than one in a hundred.
In dictum, the court went on to state, "[m]oreover, the relative rarity of the assailant's type of
blood relegates arguments as to remoteness to* the realm of weight rather than admissibility
... " Matter of Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 299, 437 N.E.2d 265, 271, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 12 (1982). In
a footnote, the court continued, "Suffice it here to say that People v. Macedonio ...and People v.
Robinson ...cited for the contrary proposition. . . each dealt with type A blood, which is found
in 40% of the population." Id at 299 n.4, 437 N.E.2d at 271 n.4, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 12 n.4.
84. People v. Horton, 99 Mich. App. 40, 50, 297 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1980).
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the weak probative value go merely to an assessment of the weight of
the evidence." Indeed, one case has indicated that the limited worth of
this evidence is so blatantly apparent that a jury could not be
prejudiced by it.
In State v. Fulton,86 a robbery occurred in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina. The victim was cut. Dried blood was found on the defend-
ant's clothing. The genetic markers discovered in the dried blood
matched the victim's blood. Frequency tables and the product rule led
to the conclusion that 11% of the population had this particular combi-
nation of genetic factors. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
frequency data should not have been admitted because it "could only
mislead the jury into believing that the particular blood type allegedly
found on defendant's shoes came from an extremely limited source
when in fact the source actually encompassed a very large number of
people."87  The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected that
contention:
Had the blood grouping test shown that the blood on defendant's
tennis shoes did not belong to the same group as [the victim's]
blood, this would have been highly significant in defendant's favor
and would tend to exonerate him. On the other hand, since the
blood test showed that the victim's blood group was the same as
the blood on defendant's shoes, the test was relevant but weakly
probative in character because 11% of the population has the same
blood type as [the victim]. In a city the size of Winston-Salem, this
11% would encompass several thousand people whose blood could
have been on defendant's shoes. The challenged statement is
therefore mildly unfavorable to the defendant but essentially
harmless because its probative value is so minute. Certainly no
prejudice resulted.8"
The court's analysis is disingenuous. The court's conclusion to-
tally ignored the possibility that the jury misused or misweighed the
evidence. Nothing indicates that the jury was informed that the fre-
quency data merely defined a subclass of people of whom the victim
was merely one of many. The jury was never told that the evidence
only indicated a chance of one in thousands that the dried blood was
indeed the victim's. If this limited import of the evidence was not
clearly and authoritatively explained, the jury may well have con-
cluded that the probability had a much stronger probative effect. In
that event, the jurors would have decided that the blood evidence alone
indicated an 89% chance that the dried blood was the victim's. If the
85. See, e.g., People v Young, 106 Mich. App. 3d 323,328, 308 N.W.2d 194, 197 (1981); State
v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 486 (1981). See also People v. Gillespie, 24 I1. App. 3d 567,
321 N.E.2d 398 (2d Dist. 1974); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 500 (1980).
86. 299 N.C. 491, 263 S.E.2d 608 (1980).
87. 299 N.C. at 496, 263 S.E.2d at 611.
88. ld at 496-97, 263 S.E.2d at 611.
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jury did misuse it in this way, the evidence, instead of being of little
value to the prosecution, would have been taken as strong evidence of
defendant's guilt. Of course, we do not know how the jury used the
probability evidence. Apparently the court felt that the proper use of
the statistic was self-evident. If so, presumably no harm to the defend-
ant resulted. Only speculation and assumptions can tell if the court's
conclusion was correct.
The court's analysis, however, indicates to trial judges that such
frequency data should not be admitted in the future. The court con-
ceded that probability statistics are weak evidence at best. As we have
seen, properly interpreted, the evidence is almost devoid of value. On
the other hand, the evidence carries with it the potential for extreme
prejudice to the defendant. Surely, then, the prejudicial impact of the
evidence greatly outweighs its probative value, and the frequency
should not be admitted.89
Not surprisingly, scholars familiar with statistics have concluded
that this approach of using frequency figures in criminal trials "ought
to be abandoned because it is appropriate to extremely few situations,
and those can be handled without statistical analysis."90 Others would
allow use of these statistics only when accompanied with a clear expla-
nation of what the frequency means.9'
89. In State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978), the state produced an expert in a
murder case who:
stated that only .85 percent of the population would have blood with the same combination of
ABO, PGM, and EAP characteristics as the victim's blood and the matching bloodstains
found on [the defendant] Carlson's jacket. [Another expert] testified that based on his studies
there was a l-in-800 chance that the foreign pubic hairs found on the victim were not Carl-
son's and a 1-in-4,500 chance that the hairs found clutched in the victim's hand were not
Carlson's.
Id at 175.
On appeal, the defendant raised the issue of whether an expert witness may express his find-
ings in terms of mathematical probabilities. Id at 173. The court first analyzed other cases which
had held that statistical evidence should not have been admitted. The court concluded that in
those cases an adequate foundation had not been laid for those numbers; here, "[i]n contrast, the
foundation for the experts' testimony in the present case was properly laid, based upon empirical
scientific data of unquestioned validity." Id at 176. The court, however, did not end its analysis
there and went on to state:
Our concern over this evidence is not with the adequacy of its foundation, but rather
with its potentially exaggerated impact on the trier of fact. Testimony expressing opinions or
conclusions in terms of statistical probabilities can make the uncertain seem all but proven
S. .  Diligent cross-examination may in some cases minimize statistical manipulation and
confine the scope of probability testimony. We are not convinced, however, that such rebut-
tal would dispel the psychological impact of the suggestion of mathematical precision ....
For these reasons, we believe [the expert's] testimony that there was only a l-in-800 chance
that the foreign pubic hairs found on the victim did not come from the accused and an even
more remote 1-in-4,500 chance that the head hairs did not belong to the accused was improp-
erly received.
Id at 176. The court did not specifically rule on the frequency derived from the blood grouping.
90. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 490.
91. In discussing the hypothetical case in which a fingerprint was said to occur once in every
thousand people, Professor Tribe concludes:
To be sure, the finding of so relatively rare a print which matches the defendant's is an
event of significant probative value, an event of which the jury should almost certainly be
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An alternative method of presenting the evidence without mislead-
ing the jury is available. Instead of presenting the frequency data, only
the size of the subclass derived from the frequency should be presented
to the jury. Thus, in the Fulton case the jury would not be told that
11% of the population had blood like the victim's and the blood found
on defendant's clothing; instead they would be told that the dried blood
could have come from any of thousands of people in the Winston-Sa-
lem area and that the victim was merely one possible source from these
thousands. This represents the proper use of such evidence. The de-
fendant, therefore, could not be prejudiced by it. Of course, presented
in this way the weakness of the evidence is clear, and the essential task
of ascertaining the probably indeterminable size of the suspect popula-
tion becomes apparent.
D. The Extremely Infrequent Frequency
Some authorities who have considered the proper use of frequency
data in criminal trials, while agreeing that probabilities of one in 1,000
are by themselves misleading indicators of guilt, have indicated that if
a small enough probability is validly generated by the product rule, it
should be accepted as proof of guilt. Thus in discussing the Collins
case, Michael Finkelstein and Professor William Fairley, after pointing
out that the product presented there represented "the frequency of
couples meeting the description of the one placed at the crime," went
on to state, "[i]f a sufficiently precise estimate could be made that the
frequency of such couples in the Los Angeles area was one in twelve
million, it would be possible to state within reasonable margins for er-
ror that there was only one such couple in the Los Angeles area. ' '92
informed. Yet the numerical index of the print's rarity, as measured by the frequency of its
random occurrence, may be more misleading than enlightening, and the jury should be in-
formed of that frequency-if at all--only if it is also given a careful explanation that there
might well be many other individuals with similar prints. The jury should thus be made to
understand that the frequency figures do not in any sense measure the probability of the
defendant's innocence.
Tribe, supra note 76, at 1355 (emphasis in original).
Glanville Williams has stated:
It is very important that when statistical information is presented to an inexpert tribunal like
a jury, explanations should be given as to its bearing on the issues. There is always the
possibility of statistical evidence of great complexity being placed before the court, which
even the judge may be incompetent to assess without assistance, and which may gain unmer-
ited credence by reason of its apparently scientific character.
Williams, supra note 77, at 299. Braun, however, states that such a frequency should be admitted
when such "evidence is coupled with other evidence linking the accused to the scene of the crime
or the victim, the concern over the admissibility of the partial transfer evidence need not be ad-
dressed because that evidence would be just one piece among others." Braun, supra note 2, at 59-
60, 77-80. Braun apparently gives little credence to the notion that such a statistic may be too
prejudicial to be admitted because its probative effect may be misweighed by the jury. Instead, he
merely concludes, without further analysis, "[tihere are adequate safeguards to protect a factfinder
from being overwhelmed by mathematical analysis where the state is attempting to identify the
accused and the criminal as the same party .... " Id at 62.
92. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 494. See also Probability, supra note 7, at 28 ("It
should also be noted that a probability such as I in 12 million presented in the Collins case, when
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On the other hand, even if a statistically valid product of one in
12,000,000 were obtained from genetic markers, the introduction of this
frequency still could be misleading. An appendix in People v. Collins
indicates the reason. The court contended that even with a frequency
of one in 12.000,000, if the population which contained the suspect
couple were large enough, a good chance exists that more than one
couple would possess the suspect's characteristics. The court derived a
formula which indicated that if the population were 12,000,000, then
the chances were about 41% that another couple besides the accused
one would have the fatal traits. The opinion concluded,
Thus the prosecution's computations, far from establishing beyond
a reasonable doubt that the Collinses were the couple described by
the prosecution's witnesses, imply a very substantial likelihood
that the area contained more than one such couple, and that a
couple other than the Collinses was the one observed at the scene
of the robbery.93
At first glance the court's conclusion may not be intuitively clear,
but an example should help clarify it. Assume that we have
120,000,000 balls; 119,999,990 are black and ten are white. The fre-
quency of the white balls in the combined population is one in
12,000,000. Assume further that all the balls are thoroughly mixed and
fed in equal numbers into ten giant urns. Each urn now contains a
population of 12,000,000 balls. One of our urns now becomes a repre-
sentative of the population of the area where the Collins robbery oc-
derived from well-defined and independent frequencies, could reflect the guilt or innocence of a
defendant."). In the context of genetic markers, a statistician has stated that when the chance is
less than one in a thousand that randomly selected persons will have the analyzed phenotypes, but
the defendant's blood matches, "the inference is often made that the accused is unlikely to be
identical for the analyzed phenotypes by chance and, therefore, it is likely that the blood found at
the scene of the crime belongs to he defendant." Selvin, supra note 9, at 195.
In the context of the Collins case, however, Professor Tribe pointed out that
even if the product rule could properly be applied to conclude that there was but one chance
in twelve million that a randomly chosen couple would possess the six features in question,
there would remain a substantial possibility that the guilty couple did not in fact possess all of
the characteristics--either because the prosecution's witnesses were mistaken or lying, or be-
cause the guilty couple was somehow disguised.
Tribe, supra note 76, at 1336.
In addition, the calculation of a frequency as small as the one in Collins can only confidently
be done if extensive empirical data first has been gathered:
But as a practical matter the court was right to doubt that the prosecutor could show
uniqueness. A derivation of such extraordinarily small probabilities with any useful degree
of precision would be extremely difficult. In most cases, the estimate of the population fre-
quency of evidentiary traces (of hair or incomplete fingerprints, for example) will have to be
made on the basis of samples numbering at most a few thousand. As a result, probabilities of
the magnitude involved in Collins would require an inference, based on a few thousand trials,
that an event would occur once rather than more than once in millions of trials. Such an
inference inevitably involves powerful assumptions which cannot be adequately supported
without extensive data. Except in cases where the number of suspects is sharply limited, it
will almost never be practically possible to gather enough data to sustain a conclusion of
uniqueness with any confidence.
Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 494-95.
93. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 335, 438 P.2d 33, 43, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 507 (1968).
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curred. We start sifting through this urn and find a white ball. Does
that mean it is the only white one present in that urn? Not necessar-
ily-if the balls were randomly deposited in the ten urns, then we can
expect some of the urns to contain no white balls, some to contain one,
and some to contain more than one. Indeed, it should be clear that
even though one white ball has been found, the chances are good that
another white one still is in the urn. The formula presented by the
Collins court attempted to give the probability for this possibility; that
is, if one white ball is found in the urn, the odds of finding another one
in the same urn. The court's conclusion was 41%.
The mathematical analysis of the Collins appendix has been criti-
cized and the criticism illustrates two important points. First, the
proper use of statistics is apparently so elusive that even those attempt-
ing to teach others about the errors of their ways cannot agree among
themselves what those errors are. Thus, one of the reasons the court's
formula was not correct, according to Finkelstein and Fairley was that
"it assumes a sampling of the population with replacement of the sam-
pled couples, instead of sampling without replacement. '9 4 The critics
stated that "the difference between replacement and nonreplacement is
critical."95 Consequently, the court's conclusion that there is a 41%
chance that another couple with the accused's characteristics exists in a
population of 12,000,000 couples overstates the odds.9 6
In a later article, Professor Fairley and Frederick Mosteller seem
to conclude that the Collins court was correct as long as the suspect
population was 12,000,000. No mention is made that the court's analy-
sis overstated the odds of finding another couple because the court's
approach posited sampling with replacement.97
Professor Robert P. Charrow and Robert L. Smith have discussed
both the Collins appendix and the Fairley and Mosteller article. They
agree that the Collins court was in error, but conclude that the court
may have understated the odds of finding another couple with the rob-
bers' characteristics, and those chances, instead of being 41% may have
in fact been as high as 65%.98
These articles reveal why lawyers and judges should be wary of
the use of statistics in a criminal case. Statistics is such a minefield that
94. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 493 n. 12.
95. Id
96. As Finkelstein and Fairley stated,
[The Collins court's figure] obviously has nothing to do with the likelihood that a couple
answering the description of the accused was correctly charged. For if there was only a single
ball in the urn representing a couple with the characteristics of the accused, the court's
formula would still yield a substantial probability of duplication (the same ball being picked
twice) although by hypothesis the accusation was correctly made.
Id
97. See Fairley & Moesteller, supra note 17, at 250 n.13.
98. Charrow & Smith,,A Conversation About "A Conversation About Collins", 64 GEo. L.J.
669, 676 (1976).
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not even those who study the field agree where the traps lay. Since the
scholars cannot always reach a consensus, can we really expect judges
and juries not trained in mathematics to evaluate properly the admissi-
bility, relevancy, or weight of the statistics? As Charrow and Smith
conclude:
Unfortunately, probability theory is a field unusually rich in para-
doxes-paradoxes that are based on "misguided intuition." Con-
sequently, if the courts ever hope to employ mathematical
techniques for the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, they
must exercise extreme care.99
This advice to the courts is meaningless, however, if those professing
knowledge about probabilities cannot even agree as to what the errant
insights are." °
These criticisms highlight a second important point. No matter
what the proper formula is for determining the odds of finding a sec-
ond couple in Collins, the size of the population is the key concern.
Thus, Fairley and Mosteller calculate that if the frequency of the rob-
bers' characteristics is one in 12,000,000, but the population were only
250,000, then the chances of finding a second couple in addition to the
accused pair would be about 1%. On the other hand, if the frequency
were one in 25,000 and the population were still 250,000, then the odds
of finding the second couple are 2,200 to 1.101 As the authors conclude,
"[Tihat shows how important it is to get a fair estimate of the propor-
tion of robber-like couples . . 102
This, of course, returns the analysis to the fundamental problem of
determining the size of the suspect population which, as discussed
above, cannot be established by any statistically valid method: it
merely must rest on unverifiable assertions. An unverifiable assertion,
as the Collins court recognized, cannot be the basis for the admission of
statistics into criminal cases.
The genetic marker evidence in the hypothetical case produced a
statistically valid frequency of one in 1,000. That frequency, however,
furnishes very weak proof because it only helps to define a subclass of
suspects and that subclass, even if calculable, an extremely doubtful
proposition, would invariably be large. On the other hand, if the true
nature of the evidence is not understood by the trier of fact, the fre-
quency evidence may be taken as strong proof against the defendant.
If so, the prejudicial impact of the evidence greatly outweighs its pro-
99. Id at 677-78.
100. Perhaps this illustrates the point made by Tribe: "The very mystery that surrounds
mathematical arguments--the relative obscurity that makes them at once impenetrable by the
layman and impressive to him--creates a continuing risk that he will give such arguments a
credence they may not deserve and a weight they cannot logically claim." Tribe, supra note 76, at
1334.
101. Finkelstein & Moesteller, supra note 17, at 251-52.
102. Id at 253.
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bative value. Thus, this analysis indicates that the frequency figure
should not be introduced into the criminal trial.
V. PROBABILITIES, CRIMINAL TRIALS, AND BAYES' THEOREM
In the hypothetical case above, we concluded that without the
blood genetic marker frequency the defendant would probably be ac-
quitted; with it, he would be convicted. This intuition is open to some
doubt.
The error, according to some commentators, is to approach the
genetic marker frequency isolated from the rest of the evidence in the
case. Taken separately, the evidence does have little probative worth,
but normally one does not weigh each piece of evidence alone. Instead,
jurors view evidence at trial as a unit. Individual facts are melded in
the jury's mind, to be taken in context of all the evidence as interpreted
by each juror's life experience. Juries find guilt in a "culmination of
probabilities."' 3 Juries often give considerable weight to fairly insig-
nificant evidence if that evidence supports an event about which the
jurors already have persuasive proof."° Conversely, juries often dis-
count evidence which would otherwise be highly persuasive because
the evidence does violence to prior beliefs held by the jury. This "cu-
mulative perspective" controls the probative significance of evidence
when statistics are not involved. 05  Finkelstein and Fairley, 10 6 and
other commentators, 0 7 argue that the same perspective should apply
103. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 497.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id
107. As Glanville Williams explains:
Take a criminal trial where a number of facts are established, with different degrees of
probability but all pointing to the guilt of the defendant. The jury or magistrates must con-
sider whether the only reasonable explanation of the facts is that the defendant is guilty, or
whether there is a fair possibility that the accumulation of apparently suspicious facts is acci-
dental. For example, suppose that evidence is given that a palm print similar to the defend-
ant's was found on the murder weapon, and that a similar print would on average be made
only by one person in a million. It cannot logically be inferred from this evidence, standing
alone, that the odds on the defendant's guilt are a million to one. Assuming a relevant popu-
lation of 10 million people, there will be about 10 people who will make the same print. If
the police, happening to have the defendant's palm print on file, arrested him and charged
him with the murder merely on that evidence, the probability of his being the culprit (ignor-
ing, as we must, any previous convictions of his) would be no more than I in 10, and even
that figure leaves out the possibility that the murderer planted the defendant's print on the
weapon, or that the defendant did the deed but lacked mens rea, and so on. However, if there
is other evidence against the defendant the palm-print evidence takes on a different colour.
The jury then have to ask themselves: what is the chance that a person who is already in-
volved in deep suspicion, as the defendant is, would turn out to be one person in a million
whose palm print corresponded with that on the weapon? That this should happen by coinci-
dence is not a chance in 10 but one in a million, and it would make no difference that the
police first suspected the defendant because he made the same palm print as that on the
weapon.
Williams, supra note 77, at 351. See also Tribe, supra note 76, at 1350. Professor Tribe states:
But the fact that mathematical evidence taken alone can rarely, if ever, establish the
crucial proposition with sufficient certitude to meet the applicable standard of proof does not
imply that such evidence-when properly combined with other, more conventional evidence in
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when statistics are involved.
Bayes' Theorem is a statistical formula which describes this pro-
cess of considering the totality of evidence.' It is best described as a
"quantitative description of the ordinary process of weighing evi-
dence."' 9 To employ the theory one hypothesizes the probability of
event A occurring. Statisticians have labelled this occurrence the
"prior possibility."'" 0 Next, one conducts observations and experi-
ments, "not to supercede but to modify the earlier probability, resulting
in a 'posterior probability' by means of the Bayes formula.""' Com-
mentators have stressed that the uses of this mathematical formula are
limited. They caution that Bayes' Theorem cannot by itself give the
probabilities that a given statement is true or false, or that a given oc-
currence will or will not occur." 12 Instead, Bayes' Theorem is simply a
method of revising a prediction of probability in light of subsequently
obtained observations. The theorem instructs one how the previous es-
timates of probability should be interpreted given the receipt of further
data. " 1
3
Glanville Williams illustrates the use of the theorem in a criminal
case:
Suppose that I am a juror in a criminal case, and am pretty satis-
fied of the defendant's guilt on the basis of a signed confession
which the defendant has rather unconvincingly disputed. Since I
am an unusually numerate juror, I attach the figure of 0.95 to the
degree that I am convinced of guilt. I am not prepared to convict
with this degree of doubt, so I look around for further evidence.
My mind goes to the fact that the defendant fled when he heard
that the police were after him. It is perfectly proper for the jury to
take this into account, for which purpose it is necessary to try to
estimate the degree of probability of guilt to attach to it. Normally
the same case-cannot supply a useful link in the process of proof. Few categories of evi-
dence indeed could ever be ruled admissible if each category had to stand on its own, unaided
by the process of cumulating information that characterizes the way any rational person uses
evidence to reach conclusions. The real issue is whether there is any acceptable way of com-
bining mathematical with non-mathematical evidence. If there is, mathematical evidence can
indeed assume the role traditionally played by other forms of proof.
Id (emphasis in original).
108. Reverend Thomas Bayes, in An Essay Toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of
Chance, PHILOSOPHICAL TRANS. OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY (1763), suggested probability judg-
ments based on intuitive guesses should be combined with probabilities based on frequencies
by the use of what has come to be known as Bayes' Theorem, a fairly simple formula ....
Tribe, supra note 76, at 1351 n.69 (citing I. GOOD, PROBABILITY AND THE WEIGHING OF Evi-
DENCE 62 (1950)). "Bayes' Theorem is a relatively simple rule discovered by the Reverend
Thomas Bayes in 1763, yet first applied to this type of inquiry only a few years ago." Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the Faco-mding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1083 (1968). Another writer
states, "Bayes' Theorem is no more than a plausible common sense description of jury behavior."
Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 126 (1976).
109. Tribe, supra note 76, at 1351 n.69.
110. See Williams, supra note 77, at 346, upon which this description leans.
Ill. Id at 347.
112. Kaplan, supra note 108, at 1083.
113. Id
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the jury would not be expected or encouraged to quantify the de-
gree, but I am going to do it, by trying to estimate how many inno-
cent persons would flee from the police. It would depend to some
extent on the gravity of the charge; here the charge is, shall we say,
murder. It would also depend on what evidence the defendant
thought the police had against him. Even an innocent person may
be frightened into a flight from justice if he knows that the police
have evidence that happens to incriminate him, and if he believes
that he cannot convincingly explain it away. Here the defendant
knew that the police had found in his possession the remains of the
poison used by the murderer. Even so, I cannot imagine that
many innocent people would be so foolish as to take off, and I
estimate the number as, at most, 20 in 100 of those who flee. I am
content to take this as a firm figure, and accordingly, 80 in 100 of
those who flee are guilty.
My estimate of the probability of guilt on the basis of the con-
fession was made without reference to the question of running
away. It covered both those hypothetical defendants who did not
run away and those who did. However, I am now directing my
attention to the fact that this defendant did run away, and accord-
ingly I wish to raise my estimate of the probability of guilt above
0.95. The question is: by how much?
Let us call the probability of guilt on the basis of the confes-
sion (the prior probability, meaning the one that one starts with)
pG. This is 0.95, and the probability of innocence (p not-G) is
0.05 (1 - 0.95). Let us call the second event, running away, E.
Hidden within pG are two separate figures: the probability of G
on the assumption that E has taken place (pG/E), and the
probability of G on the assumption that it has not (pG/not-E).
The former figure is greater than pG, and the latter is less than pG.
Our task is to find pG/E.
We need not go into the algebra. The procedure can be re-
duced to simple terms, which are vouched for by the statisticians.
Write down, in one column, the prior probabilities, and in the next
column the two variants of pE: the probability of the defendant
running away and being guilty (pE/G), and the probability of his
running away and being innocent (pE/not-G). They are in the
proportion of 0.8 to 0.2, and for the purpose of the calculation may
be taken as these two figures. Multiply the two sets of figures
together.
Priors Event Multiply
pG 0.95 pE/G 0.8 0.760
p not-G 0.05 pE/not-G 0.2 0.010
The posterior probabilities will be in the proportion 0.76 : 0.01.
But these do not add up to 1. Unity is restored to the total by an
arithmetical trick: add them together, and divide the sum into
each.
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Add Posteriors
0.76 0.76 - 0.77 = 0.99
0.01 0.01 0.77 = 0.01
0.77
Behold! The two fractions (rounded off to two points of decimals)
now add up to 1. The posterior probability of guilt on the assump-
tion of E (pG/E) is 0.99 (actually a trifle more than 0.987, but still
a significant increase from 0.95), and the posterior probability of
innocence on the assumption of E (p not-G/E is 0.01).
Bayes' Theorem can be applied to each piece of evidence.
The hypothetical example assumed as one of its facts that the po-
lice found the poison used for the murder in the defendant's pos-
session. This is an independently incriminating fact: in the
previous calculation it counted for innocence, not guilt, so it is
proper to do another calculation weighing it for guilt. Let me as-
sume that nine out of ten persons against whom such evidence is
given are guilty of murder; the actual figure is probably higher.
Doing another Bayes' calculation, the probability of the defend-
ant's guilt now rises from 0.987 to 0.9985. "4
To use Bayes' Theorem in the hypothetical blood marker case, the
jury would first estimate the probability of guilt from all the non-statis-
tical evidence. Of course, no precise measure would exist for this
number; instead, the jurors would have to make a subjective determi-
nation. Then, using Bayes' Theorem, the jurors would factor in the
genetic marker frequency, that is, that only one in a thousand people
have blood like that found at the crime scene and possessed by the
114. Williams, supra note 77, at 347-48. Professor Kaplan illustrates the theorem in another
setting:
If we are attempting to discriminate between two mutually exclusive hypotheses, Bayes'
Theorem can be written in the following form: Q, = LQo. In this formula, Q. refers to our
previous idea of the odds on one hypothesis and L is the ratio of the probability that the
observed evidence would have occurred under that hypothesis to the probability that the
same evidence would have occurred under the other. Q1, of course, refers to the odds on the
hypothesis calculated after receipt of the additional data. Bayes' Theorem thus quantifies the
commonsense conclusion that if a given piece of new evidence more probably would have
occurred under hypothesis A than under hypothesis B, the receipt of that piece of evidence
should raise somewhat our previous estimate of the odds that hypothesis A is correct. L, the
probability ratio, is generally a more familiar item for us to compute than is the likelihood of
the correctness of the hypothesis. Thus, let us assume that an oil geologist may be able to say
that if a field of unknown productivity is in fact commercially productive, the probability is
two-thirds that oil will be discovered (and hence one-third that it will not be) in a well drilled
to a depth of 10,000 feet at a random spot in the field. The geologist may also be able to say
that if the field is not commercially productive the probability is four-fifths that oil will not be
discovered in the well. If a well is then drilled and proves unproductive, Bayes' Theorem will
tell the geologist that he should now change his estimate of the odds that the field is a com-
mercially productive field by multiplying his prior idea (Q0) by the probability of 1/3 / 4/5
or 5/12. The odds that the field is productive are now less than half as great as before the
well was drilled.
Kaplan, supra note 108, at 1083-84. Mathematical derivations as well as verbal descriptions of the
formula can be found in Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 498-501; Tribe, supra note 76, at
1350-54.
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defendant. Here Finkelstein and Fairley have made the task easier
since they have compiled a table of calculations of Bayes' Theorem for
various values." 5 They have concluded that if the prior assessment of
guilt based on the non-statistical evidence is .01, .1, .25, .50, .75, and the
frequency evidence is one in 1,000 or .001, then Bayes' Theorem leads
to the subsequent probabilities .909, .991, .997, .9990, or .9996, respec-
tively. Therefore, if the prior odds of guilt were calculated to be as low
as one in ten, the subsequent probability will be over 99%.
A. The Bayes' Theorem Debate
Finkelstein and Fairley, strong proponents of the use of Bayes'
Theorem in criminal trials,' 6 indicate that one of the Theorem's prime
advantages is that the probative force of the frequency evidence is no
longer dependent upon the size of the suspect population.'' 7 Bayes'
Theorem, according to Finkelstein and Fairley, has additional advan-
tages. They stress that the use of quantitative measures of guilt will
force conscientious jurors to consider the evidence more circumspectly,
and exclude impermissible evidence such as appearance or
prejudice."' Further, Bayesian analysis, according to the authors,
would demonstrate to the jury that an apparently damning probability
figure like one in 1,000 could be relatively insignificant if prior suspi-
cion were relatively weak.' '9
115. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 500.
116. Finkelstein and Fairley give the following outline as to how the jury could be instructed
to use Bayes' Theorem:
An expert witness could explain to jurors that their view of the statistical evidence should
depend on their view of the other evidence. He might then suggest a range of hypothetical
prior probabilities, specifying the posterior probability associated with each prior. Each juror
could then pick the prior estimate that most closely matched his own view of the evidence
.... To minimize the possibility that a prosecutor would prejudice the defendant's case by
choosing only highly incriminating "hypothetical" prior probabilities, an expert so testifying
should be required to show the posterior probabilities associated with a broad range of prior
estimates. Such a procedure would also foreclose the chance that jurors would consider the
expert as inteijecting his own opinion as to the appropriate prior.
Id at 502.
117. The statement that prints with particular characteristics occur with a frequency of one
in a thousand persons means only that a defendant who has such a print is a thousand times
more likely to have left it than someone selected at random from the population. By itself,
this is not a meaningful statistic for measuring probability of guilt. As we have seen, a de-
fendant could be a thousand times more likely to be guilty than someone selected at random
and still more likely to be innocent than guilty. The comparison with a random selection is
irrelevant. The jury's function is not to compare a defendant with a person selected randomly
but to weigh the probability of defendant's guilt against the probability that anyone else was
responsible. Bayes' Theorem translates the one-in-a-thousand statistic into a probability
statement which describes the probative force of that statistic.
Id at 502 (emphasis in original).
118. Glanville Williams similarly concludes, "[W]orking out Bayes' theorem is good disci-
pline because every assumption must be clearly specified. . . . [Tihe ordinary juror who follows
this ordinary procedure does not really know what his thought-processes are, the Bayesian juror
does so to a much greater extent." Williams, supra note 77, at 349.
119. Probably the greatest danger to a defendant from Bayesian methods is that jurors may
be surprised at the strength of the inference of guilt flowing from the combination of their
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The conclusion that frequency evidence, such as that generated by
genetic markers, can best be integrated into criminal trials though the
use of Bayes' Theorem has been vigorously challenged, most notably
by Professor Laurence Tribe. 12° Tribe first concludes that the Bayesian
approach should not be permitted because it will not lead to the preci-
sion that its proponents claim and because it will distort the fact-find-
ing process by overwhelming the non-quantifiable aspects of a criminal
case.
As we have seen, Bayes' Theorem can only be used when a
probability of guilt exists apart from the frequency evidence. Tribe
argues, however, that jurors are not equipped to assess this starting
point since few have ever done such probability estimations. Conse-
quently a number picked by a juror will be "spuriously exact."' 2' Be-
cause the application of Bayes' Theorem thus "compels the jury to
begin with a number of the most dubious value,"'12 2 Tribe argues that
the use of that technique at trial would yield inaccurate and mislead-
ingly precise conclusions.
Inaccuracies also will result because the evidence of guilt will be
counted more than once in assessing the various probabilities. The
jury, if it is to operate in the traditional way, will only assess the
probabilities after the receipt of all the evidence. Certainly, knowledge
of the genetic marker evidence will color the juror's assessment of the
prior suspicions and the statistical evidence. But this, if the suspicions are correctly esti-
mated, is no more than the evidence deserves.
Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 517.
Finkelstein and Fairley state that they made an informal, nonrandom survey of intuitions of
guilt based upon their hypothetical case. They found that the addition of the frequency evidence
was thought to raise the probability of guilt, but assessments of the weight of this evidence
varied widely, and the subjects were uncertain how to treat the new information. In most
cases the assessments were not as great as they would have been if the probabilities had been
computed in accordance with Bayes' theorem.
Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 502 n.33.
120. See Tribe, supra note 76. Tribe wrote his article as a response to Finkelstein and Fairley.
Finkelstein and Fairley responded to Tribe in Finkelstein & Fairley, .4 Comment on "Trial By
Mathematics", 84 HARV. L. REV. 1801 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Finkelstein & Fairley II]. Tribe
answered this rebuttal in Tribe, .4 Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1810
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Tribe II]. See also Braun, supra note 2; Williams, supra note 77. For
an application of Bayes' Theorem to the criminal appellate process, see Korstein, supra note 108,
at 140-44.
121. Tribe, supra note 76, at 1359.
122. Id Kornstein indicates that the initial probability may be reached by averaging and
therefore
it may be totally inaccurate because it ignores group dynamics. Averaging jurors' estimates
simply does not duplicate the process of give-and-take that occurs in the jury room. An
average fails to account for conformity effect, cognitive dissonance, and other psychological
interactions. Consequently, a jury might well arrive at a real verdict quite different from the
verdict dictated by the formula.
Kornstein, supra note 108, at 140. Braun contends, "There is. .. no guarantee that a jury would
have an adequate evidentiary basis to quantify a degree of belief in the accused's guilt, and even if
such a basis existed, jurors may lack the ability to translate that degree of belief into a number."
Braun, supra note 2, at 53. Glanville Williams states, "The most obvious objection to attempting
to translate the probability of ordinary life and of the law courts into mathematical terms is that
our data are too vague to justify precise statement." Williams, supra note 77, at 305.
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probabilities arising from the rest of the case. This means that the
marker evidence will be counted twice--once to set the prior
probability and then again in Bayes' Theorem. This, of course, over-
states the value of the genetic evidence.
1 23
Bayes' Theorem, according to Tribe, also presents additional
problems of the "overbearing impressiveness of numbers" and "the
dwarfing of soft variables." 24 Tribe is concerned that the Bayesian ap-
proach will lead the jury into concentrating on the statistics at the ex-
pense of more impressionistic evidence because this latter evidence
cannot be easily reduced to numbers.' 25 As a result, the jury might be
led into believing that the formula tends to be conclusive on the ques-
tion of guilt when, in fact, it cannot be. In the hypothetical case, Bayes'
Theorem could not generate a probability as to the defendant's guilt.
123. See Tribe, supra note 76, at 1366-68. See also Tribe II, supra note 120, at 1816 n.31:
[Elven if the prior could be estimated without any consideration of the statistical evidence,
the proposed application of Bayes' Theorem-at any point in the trial-would entail a dis-
torted outcome whenever some or all of the evidence that underlay the prior is conditionally
dependent upon the statistical evidence, a circumstance whose presence or absence cannot be
feasibly determined in any given case.
Williams also gives an illustration of this problem:
At what point in the charge does one start calculating the prior probability? The police arrest
a man who is behaving suspiciously at dead of night, and afterwards obtain confirmatory
evidence that he has committed theft. Is the prior probability based on the man's suspicious
behavior, or is it based on the fact that he has been charged, or just on the fact that he is a
man? It cannot reasonably be based on the fact that the man has been charged, because the
charge was based on evidence known to the police, and to use the charge to create a prior
probability, and then to use the evidence to create a posterior probability, would be to use the
evidence twice over.
Williams, supra note 77, at 350. Dr. Braun argues:
An additional problem with using subjective probability to weigh the evidence is that jury
determinations, however tentative, that are made before all the evidence is in must be preju-
dicial to the defendant. . . . It is doubtful, however, that a juror could arbitrarily ignore a
piece of evidence already heard to make an initial determination of culpability and thus use
that determination in conjunction with the evidence initially ignored to arrive at a quantifier
expressing the probability that the accused committed the relevant criminal act.
Braun, supra note 2, at 54.
124. Tribe, supra note 76, at 1361. Glanville Williams summarizes:
There is a danger in the combination of subjective judgment and mathematics, as Professor
Tribe points out. If it were all presented to a jury, they might be hypnotised by the end-figure
of 0.9985, and attend insufficiently to its fragile evidential base. If firm statistics took the
place of some of the conjectured figures, while other conjectured figures remained (as they
very likely would), it might be even worse. Professor Tribe calls this danger "the dwarfing of
soft variables." Further danger would occur if the jury were asked to estimate pG, the
probability of guilt on the basis of only part of the evidence. The traditional view is that the
jury must consider the evidence as a whole before reaching a decision. A jury invited to
apply Bayes would very probably make a mistake, or have their attention diverted from im-
portant issues.
Williams, supra note 77, at 348-49.
125. The syndrome is a familiar one: If you can't count it, it doesn't exist. Equipped with a
mathematically powerful intellectual machine, even the most sophisticated user is subject to
an overwhelming temptation to feed his pet the food it can most comfortably digest. Readily
quantifiable factors are easier to process-and hence more likely to be recognized and then
reflected in the outcome--than are factors that resist ready quantification. The result, despite
what turns out to be a spurious appearance of accuracy and completeness, is likely to be
significantly warped and hence highly suspect.
Tribe, supra note 76, at 1365-66.
[Vol. 1983
BLOOD MARKERS
Even if it could prove with certitude that the blood at the scene came
from the defendant, it could not prove that he either killed the victim
or, if he did, that he was guilty of a crime. For instance, perhaps he
arrived at the crime scene, saw the victim attempting to commit suicide,
and was cut in a struggle. Perhaps he fought with someone besides the
victim at the scene and that other person was the killer. Perhaps he got
in a fight with the victim. After she cut him, he may have fled and
someone came along later who killed her. The defendant may have
killed her in self-defense, or even accidentally. Perhaps he killed under
an emotional state which mitigates murder to manslaughter, or perhaps
he killed her, but was insane.
Bayes' Theorem cannot speak to those possibilities. At best, the
formula only gives a probability that defendant was present at the
crime scene, nothing more. It does not speak to guilt. That limitation,
however, might be lost as the theorem is applied. "One consequence of
mathematical proof, then, may be to shift the focus away from such
elements as volition, knowledge, and intent, and towards such elements
as identity and occurrence . . 126
Tribe goes on to argue, however, that even if the application of
Bayes' Theorem in a criminal trial were workable and accurate, the
Bayesian methods would still "undermine the presumption of inno-
cence, erode the values served by the reasonable doubt standard, and
exacerbate the dehumanization of justice."'' 27 Tribe concludes that the
supports for the presumption of innocence will be knocked away
because
the trier is forced by the Finkelstein-Fairley technique to arrive at
an explicit quantitative estimate of the likely truth at or near the
trial's start, or at least before some of the most significant evidence
has been put before him ....
126. Id at 1366. Tribe also argues:
But then we have come full circle. At the outset some way of integrating the mathemati-
cal evidence with the non-mathematical was sought, so that the jury would not be confronted
with an impressive number that it could not intelligently combine with the rest of the evi-
dence, and to which it would therefore be tempted to assign disproportionate weight. At first
glance, the use Finkelstein and Fairley made of Bayes' Theorem appeared to provide the
needed amalgam. Yet, on closer inspection, their method too left a number--the exaggerated
and much more impressive P(X/E) = .997-which the jury must again be asked to balance
against such fuzzy imponderables as the risk of frameup or misobservation, if indeed it is not
induced to ignore those imponderables altogether.
What is least clear in all of this is whether the proponents of mathematical proof have
made any headway at all. Even assuming with Finkelstein and Fairley that the accuracy of
trial outcomes could be somewhat enhanced if all crucial variables could be quantified pre-
cisely and analyzed with the aid of Bayes' Theorem, it simply does not follow that trial accu-
racy will be enhanced if some of the important variables are quantified and subjected to
Bayesian analysis, leaving the softer ones--those to which meaningful numbers are hardest to
attach-in an impressionistic limbo. On the contrary, the excesssive weight that will thereby
be given to those factors that can most easily be treated mathematically indicates that, on
balance, more mistakes may well be made with partial quantification than with no quantifica-
tion at all.
Id at 1365 (emphasis in original).
127. Tribe II, supra note 120, at 1815.
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A juror compelled to derive a quantitative measure...
of the defendant's likely guilt after having heard no evidence at all
. . . cannot escape the task of deciding just how much weight to
give the undeniable fact that the defendant is, after all, not a per-
son chosen at random but one strongly suspected and hence ac-
cused by officials of the state after investigation. 28
Finkelstein and Fairley's proposal, however, does not just under-
cut the presumption; instead, their suggestion totally disregards it.
Bayes' Theorem, if it works correctly for frequency evidence such as
that derived from genetic markers, should also work for the receipt of
every piece of evidence as long as a probability can be assigned the
evidence. How, then, should that first piece of evidence be treated?
Suppose a robbery in which the victim convincingly identifies the de-
fendant at trial. The jurors believe that the probability of the identifi-
cation being correct is 99.9%. This would seem to indicate that the
juror is convinced that the odds are one in 1,000 that the wrong person
is on trial. Can Bayes' Theorem be applied to this situation? With just
this one probability, the formula is useless since the theorem only al-
lows modification of an already existing probability. Two possibilities
exist in this situation. First, the jurors may use their 99.9% figure as the
initial probability which will be modified by the use of Bayes' Theorem
provided further evidence is received. This approach acts as if the pre-
sumption of innocence did not exist.
On the other hand, if a reasonable doubt can be quantified, a con-
cept at least implicit in the use of Bayes' Theorem, 2 9 the presumption
of innocence also should be quantifiable. One approach to quantifying
the presumption of innocence would conclude that, before any evi-
dence is admitted, the presumption indicates no chance that the de-
fendant is guilty. In Bayesian terminology that translates to mean an
initial probability of zero. If so, Bayes' Theorem cannot be applied
since the formula requires the multiplication of this initial probability
by the probabilities assessed for the received evidence. This multiplica-
tion would always result with a probability of zero, and a defendant
could never be found guilty. Instead of treating the presumption of
innocence as zero, Professor Kaplan has argued that the defendant's
chances of guilt, measured before the receipt of evidence, are the same
as the chances of guilt for anyone else in the country. Using this logic,
he has assigned the probability of guilt for the purposes of assessing the
presumption of innocence. ' 31
128. Tribe, supra note 76, at 1368-69.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 130-36.
130. Courts, however, make no effort to instruct the jury on the magnitude of [the initial
odds of guilt] or on how they should compute it. But courts do emphasize the presumption of
innocence. The instruction on this presumption is more than a direction to the jury not to
consider as evidence against the defendant the fact that he has been indicted and is being
tried. It is a direction, at the very least, that the jury not assume at the outset of their consider-
ation of the case that the defendant is more likely guilty than not. Thus the jury is being told
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This numerical assessment of the initial probability for purposes of
applying Bayes' Theorem still leads to ludicrous results. In the the hy-
pothetical robbery, the jury agrees that there is a 99.9% chance that the
identification is correct. Presumably, the normal jury will convict
based upon this evidence alone. If the triers apply Bayes' Theorem,
however, with the presumption of innocence treated as the prior
probability and set at 1/200,000,000, the will reach the conclusion that
the probability of guilt is only about five in 1,000,000."''
Assume further that the prosecutor not only introduces this identi-
fication but also a confession by the defendant. The jurors are so im-
pressed with the reliability of the statements that the jurors conclude
that there is only one chance in 1000 that the confession is not truthful.
With these two pieces of evidence surely a conviction should result.
However, if the jury starts with the presumption of innocence as
1/200,000,000 and then applies Bayes' Theorem successively to the
probabilities derived from the identification and the confession, the
that [the initial odds of guilt are] certainly not more than one-half. We can, indeed, go fur-
ther than this and regard the presumption-of-innocence instruction as a direction to the jury
to begin their consideration of the case by assuming that. . . the initial odds on guilt. . . are
to be considered "quite small." One could even speculate that a reasonable value of [the
initial odds of guilt] is 1:200 million--that this defendant is no more likely a priori to be the
guilty party (assuming that there is a guilty party) than is anyone else in the United States.
Kaplan, supra note 108, at 1085-86.
131. In applying Bayes' Theorem to a hypothetical criminal case, Finkelstein and Fairley
made some assumptions. See Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 498-500. Tribe challenges
the validity of those assumptions and goes on to state that, without the assumptions, Bayes' Theo-
rem will have such a "messy form" that its application will have "strained the system beyond its
breaking point." Tribe, supra note 76, at 1362-65. However, if we accept the proponents' assump-
tions and apply them here, Bayes' Theorem takes the following form:
Posterior probability =
prior probability
prior probability + [probability that defendant not guilty derived from presented evidence
X (I-prior probability).]
The prior probability here is the presumption of innocence or 1/200,000,000 or .000000005. Since
the identification indicates a .999 chance of guilt, the identification would indicate the defendant
was not guilty only one in 1000 times or .001. Thus the posterior probability equals
.000000005
.000000005 + (.001 x .999999995)
.000000005
.000000005 + .000999999995 = .000005
Selvin, supra note 9, at 31-32, presents a different derivation of Bayes' Theorem. Selvin indi-
cates that
posterior probability = 1.0
1.0 = [probability of not guilty derived from presented evidence X
(I-prior probability/prior probability).]
The denominator would equal
1.0 + (.001 x 199999999) =
1.0 + [.001 x (.999999995/.000000005)]=
1.0 + 199999.999 + 200001.999.
Thus, the posterior probability equals 1.0/200002 or five in 1,000,000.
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probability of guilt merely becomes five in 1,000.132 Once again acquit-
tal is required. Surely something is wrong.
Thus, if the presumption of innocence is factored into Bayes' The-
orem, ludicrous results occur. Finkelstein and Fairley ignore this.
Their proposal can only work if the jury calculates the initial
probability of guilt after the receipt of at least the first piece of evidence
and without reference to the presumption of innocence. In other
words, Bayes' Theorem can only work if the presumption of innocence
disappears from consideration.
Tribe also believes that the application of Bayes' Theorem to crim-
inal trials will destroy our present doctrine of reasonable doubt since
the theorem presupposes that reasonable doubt can be quantified.
Thus, if a jury utilizing the theorem concludes that the probability of
guilt is 99% and convicts, the jury has, at least implicitly, reached the
conclusion that a 1% chance that the defendant is not guilty does not
constitute a reasonable doubt. 33 Although it may be natural to assume
that reasonable doubt can be quantified, 34 Tribe contends that "the
system does not in fact authorize the imposition of criminal punish-
ment when the trier recognizes a quantifiable doubt as to the defend-
ant's guilt. Instead, the system dramatically-if imprecisely-insists
upon as close an approximation to certainty as seems humanly attaina-
ble in the circumstances."'' 3
5
132. The posterior probability obtained by modifying the presumption of innocence by the
receipt of the identification is .000005. This now becomes the prior probability which is modified
by the probability assigned to the confession. Thus, the prior probability, in Finkelstein and
Fairley's formulation equals
.000005
.000005 + (.001 x .999995).
133. Tribe contends,
An inescapable corollary of the proposed method, and indeed of any method that aims to
assimilate mathematical proof by quantifying the probative force of evidence generally, is
that it leaves the trier of fact, when all is said and done, with a number that purports to
represent his assessment of the probability that the defendant is guilty as charged.
Tribe, supra note 76, at 1372. "Even when the number measures only one element of the offense
and omits an element like intent. . . it sets an upper bound on the probability of guilt. Id.
at 1372 n.138.
For example, if the figure of 99.7 per cent represents only the probability that the print was
the defendant's, leaving a margin of doubt of .3 per cent on the issue of the print's identifica-
tion, it seems clear that there will be an even larger margin of doubt on the ultimate issue of
the defendant's guilt.
Tribe II, supra note 120, at 1818 (emphasis in original).
134. Glanville Williams states that
it is natural to assume that "reasonable doubt" in a criminal case can in principle be quanti-
fied. Everyone realises that legal proof cannot in fact at present be translated into a precise
numerical figure, but we have never decisively dismissed the notion that in principle, or in the
ideal world, it could be.
Williams, supra note 77, at 297. Another writer notes, "While attempts at quantification show that
'beyond a reasonable doubt' denotes the probability of guilt somewhere around .90, the standard
is indeed vague, and thus likely to be a source of disagreement." Kornstein, supra note 108, at
143.
135. Tribe, supra note 76, at 1374 (emphasis in original). Finkelstein and Fairley describe
"beyond a reasonable doubt" differently: "When we say that defendant is guilty beyond a reason-
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If we allow the quantification of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
we are stating that our criminal system, as part of its normal function-
ing, tolerates the conviction of innocent people. If proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt were set at 99.5%, then the criminal system frankly
condones the punishment of one innocent person out of every two hun-
dred, a result from which most people "recoil."' 36 Our courts would
convict admittedly innocent defendants. If proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is seen as a normative goal of certainty, however, the conviction
of the innocent is not considered to be an acceptable result of the crimi-
nal system. Instead, it is an abberation-a breakdown in that system.
The quantification of a reasonable doubt, as Bayes' Theorem requires,
is a statement that our society is willing to condone the conviction of
numbers of innocent people. Tribe contends that a just society should
never be willing to tolerate such a result.137
Tribe's arguments, however, have recently come under attack by
Professors Saks and Kidd.13  They strongly contest Tribe's assertion
that the jury will overvalue a statistical presentation at the expense of
the other evidence. Relying upon various empirical studies, they con-
able doubt, we mean that the evidence has brought us to a state of belief such that if everyone
were convicted when we had such a belief the decisions would rarely be wrong." Finkelstein &
Fairley, supra note 2, at 504.
136. Kaplan, supra note 108, at 1073. Dr. Braun states:
To develop a quantifier after hearing all the evidence and to use it to decide the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence of the accused would, at the very least, add a superfluous step
to the decisionmaking process and would, at worst, dehumanize the judicial process at the
expense of the accused. . . . Such a quantifier could be used only in conjunction with the
establishment of a threshold probability value, which would, if exceeded, indicate a belief
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the quantifier would serve only to shift the philosophical
emphasis from minimizing the chance of convicting an innocent defendant to establishing a
tolerance level for how many innocent people the juror was willing to convict to ensure con-
viction of the guilty.
Braun, supra note 2, at 51-52. See also Kornstein, supra note 108, at 139. But see Williams, supra
note 77, at 305-06.
Using numbers has the advantage of making one face the unpleasant fact that convicting in a
criminal case on a probability of 0.95, high though that may seem at first sight, involves the
probability of convicting one innocent person in 20. This is more unwelcome when the con-
viction is of murder than when it is of a parking offense. Still, the prospect of having to
acquit 19 murderers because you are afraid of convicting one innocent person is also
uninviting.
Id
137. See Tribe, supra note 76, at 1372-77. Glanville Williams summarizes:
The tribunal in a criminal case must feel sure of guilt. It must have no doubts-apart from
unreasonable doubts and fanciful doubts, as is sometimes said. If a juror is able to calculate
that he is 99 per cent. sure, then he already has a doubt, in legal theory, and ought not to
convict.. . . Of course, magistrates and reflective jurors know that mistakes are inherent in
any human institution. In that sense, they know that there is always the possibility of making
a mistake when convicting. But it is a general and theoretical doubt. What the law demands
is that on this occasion, in respect of this defendant, you must feel sure. To depart in any way
from this requirement would erode the protection given by the criminal process to defendants
who may be falsely accused. It would be a public proclamation of callousness towards the
possibility of convicting the innocent, and it would dilute confidence in the justice of the legal
system.
Williams, supra note 77, at 306 (emphasis in original).
138. Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing andAdudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L.
& Soc'y REV. 123 (1981).
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clude that people who have to make decisions based upon complex in-
formation use simplifying mental strategies in order to make their
choices. 139 Contrary to what Tribe assumes,"4 Saks and Kidd contend
that the empirical results indicate that in using the simplifying
processes, people do not overvalue the quantitative or probabilistic evi-
dence. Rather, people give too little weight to the probabilities.' 4 '
Saks and Kidd conclude that jury verdicts will be more accurate if ju-
rors are allowed and encouraged to use mathematical tools:' 4 2
139. Id at 127-31. Saks and Kidd label the simplifying stategies as "heuristics."
140. Saks and Kidd state that Tribe's conclusions are based on unproven assumptions: "In-
fluential as Tribe's paper has been, like much legal scholarship, it is a Swiss cheese of assumptions
about human behavior-in this case human decision-making processes-which are asserted as
true simply because they fall within the wide reach of merely plausible, not because any evidence
is adduced on their behalf." Id at 125.
141. Id at 134. The information presented by Saks and Kidd support one of Tribe's conten-
tions. Tribe maintained that jurors will not be able to set proper prior probabilities once they
learn the frequency evidence, that knowledge of the genetic marker evidence will color the assess-
ment of the probability of guilt arising from the rest of the case. See supra text accompanying
note 123. Saks and Kidd state:
One fact, however, can be unambiguously derived from the extensive literature on the
psychology of decision making. People tend to be overconfident in their judgments. Not
only do individuals tend to overestimate how much they already know, but they also tend to
underestimate how much they have just learned from facts presented in a particular context.
Once they do know an outcome, people fail to appreciate how uncertain they were before
learning of it ...
Essentially, people find it difficult to disregard information that they already possess.
Telling people that an event has occurred causes them to report that the event was more likely
to have happened. Furthermore, hearing such information does not also cause them to report
that the information affected their perceptions or decisions. People do not appreciate the
extent to which hearing new information has an effect on their judgments.
Why do people tend to be overconfident in their judgments? One possibility is that indi-
viduals reinterpret previous information in light of new information, so that the two sets of
information are integrated into a coherent whole. The "old" view of these events is assimi-
lated into the "new" correct view in such a natural and immediate fashion that the assimilator
is unaware that his or her perspective has been altered. The outcome psychologically is that
the person reports that he or she really knew the answer or held the same opinion previously,
and that a discrepancy never existed between initial reactions and the apparent conclusions.
Saks & Kidd, supra note 138, at 143-44. Therefore, knowledge of the genetic marker evidence will
become assimilated into the nonstatistical evidence without the jurors being aware of the assimila-
tion. As a result, jurors will inevitably set the prior probability higher than is warranted by just
the nonstatistical evidence.
Professors Saks and Kidd go on to suggest that this "hindsight effect" is an inherent problem
in criminal trials.
In a criminal trial, people are first given the "answer"--that is, the defendant. Then, the
evidence is provided, and the fact finder is asked whether the evidence does in fact prove the
conclusion. This arrangement seems especially prone to hindsight. Each of the bits of evi-
dence will appear more likely to lead to the defendant than they would have if the defendant
were not already known. Analogizing from the hindsight experiments to the "fact finders" at
trial, the evidence will seem to point more surely to the answer than it did when the investiga-
tors were developing the evidence. It may be that the high standard of proof required for a
finding of guilt makes up for the peculiarity (and consequent distorting effects) of the way the
question is posed: answer first. It is noteworthy that only criminal proceedings are framed
this way and only criminal proceedings require the highest standard of proof. An interesting
alternative procedure might be to experiment with trials in which the evidence is presented
first and fact finders are asked which of several defandants, if any, is the guilty party. Under
such conditions, fact finders, lacking the judgmental bias produced by hindsight, would prob-
ably be less sure of their judgments than is true with the existing criminal trial structure.
Id at 145.
142. Professors Saks and Kidd contend "that while certain errors and harm may be inherent
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Our suggestion is modest, and most lawyers should find it
comfortingly traditional. Namely, experts ought to be permitted
to offer their data, their algorithms, and their Bayesian theorems.
The errors that may be introduced will be subjected to adversarial
cross-examination. Various formal mathematical models do have
room for errors-variables omitted, poor measurements, and
others that Tribe has cogently presented. But so do intuitive tech-
niques. Properly employed and developed, the former can have
fewer. It is up to opposing counsel to unmask the errors. More-
over, as a matter of developing and introducing new tools from
what might be called decision-making technology, the identifica-
tion of flaws does not imply that the tools ought not to be used.
The proper question is whether the tool, however imperfect, still
aids the decision maker more than no tool at all.'" 3
B. Once Again, Bayes' Theorem
In the debate over the use of Bayes' Theorem, time has made Pro-
fessor Tribe the defacto winner. Although these issues have been de-
bated for some time, nothing in the reported cases indicates that Bayes'
Theorem has been presented to juries or applied by the triers of fact.
This, therefore, might seem an effective end of the discussion.
The debate needs to be started anew, however, for Bayes' Theorem
has again been proposed for use in criminal trials-this time explicitly
in conjunction with blood genetic marker evidence.' Because the use
of genetic marker phenotyping recently has become widespread in fo-
rensic laboratories and because criminal cases now are subject to a
flood of such evidence, a5 the use of Bayes' Theorem in criminal litiga-
tion may become extensive. Before Bayes' Theorem becomes widely
employed by trial courts, the theorem should be scrutinized closely.
Three recent commentators, Selvin, Grunbaum, and Myhre con-
tend that Bayes' Theorem can be used to calculate the probability that
blood found at the crime scene was the defendant's blood. Their ap-
proach follows that of Finkelstein and Fairley. Further, these com-
even in the proper use of probabilistic tools, even more harm may be inherent in not using them."
Saks & Kidd, supra note 138, at 125. After surveying the empirical studies, they conclude:
Unaided individuals tend to have great difficulty incorporating quantified variables, give ex-
cessive weight to bits and pieces that happen for whatever reason to be salient, base their
decisions on less information (often the less useful information) than do mathematical mod-
els, and apply their decision policies inconsistently. .... This presents an interesting set of
concerns about human decision making that contrasts with Tribe's concerns about mathemat-
ical decision making. The problems associated with drawing inferences from probability evi-
dence, problems Tribe would like to see the courts avoid, are not avoided by dumping the
data, quantitative as well as nonquantitative, into the mental laps of human decision makers,
armed only with their intuitition.
Id at 147.
143. Id at 148.
144. See Probability, supra note 7. The same proposal, in a somewhat shorter form, is also
presented in Selvin. supra note 9, at 195-96.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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mentators claim that Bayes' Theorem allows the trier of fact to
calculate the probability that a person whose blood matches the blood
found at a crime scene was present (denoted: P (present/coincidence)),
by using Bayes' Theorem to combine the prior probability of the de-
fendant's presence at the scene (P(present)) derived from all the
nongenetic evidence and the frequency derived from the genetic
data.' 46 These commentators maintain that where C equals the genetic
frequency figure, Bayes' Theorem leads to. the following equation:
1.0
P(present/coincidence) = 1.0 + C[P(not present)/P(present)]. 47
The authors give a simple illustration. 41 If the prior probability is
assumed to be .50 (and consequently P(not present) = .50), and the
genetic analysis of blood found at the scene matches the defendant's
with that phenotype combination occurring in the relevant population
with a frequency of .0097, then applying Bayes' Theorem, the subse-
quent probability of presence equals 1.0/((1.0 + .0097(.5/134)) =
1.0/(1.0 + .0097(1)) = 1.0/(1.0 + .0097) = .990. In other words, the
probability that it was defendant's blood at the scene is 99%.
This proposed application of Bayes' Theorem is basically the same
as that advocated by Finkelstein and Fairley and is therefore not sur-
prising. What is surprising is that the proposal is made without any
reference to the criticisms of the Finkelstein and Fairly approach. No-
where are the concerns raised by Tribe and others even mentioned.
Instead, the article actually furnishes an example of one of the dangers
listed by Tribe. He contended that the Bayesian approach would result
in the hard numbers overwhelming the soft variables. Thus, the trier of
fact would lose sight of the limitations of the statistical approach. Al-
most as if to further this contention, the authors write about their Baye-
sian formula:
This expression shows that when the value C decreases, the
P(present/coincidence) approaches 1.0 for realistic values of
P(present). That is, when the probability is small that a person
who was assumed not present at the crime scene matches the given
blood phenotypes, then it can be inferred that the defendant was,
in fact, at the crime scene (ie., not falsely accused). 149
As discussed above, 50 presence at the scene does not equal guilt.
If the authors of this proposal, sophisticated in the uses of statistics,
cannot keep this distinction clear, can we expect a lay jury to under-
stand the limitations of Bayes' Theorem?
This proposal does recognize, however, the difficulty, if not the im-
146. Probability,supra note 7, at 31-32.
147. Id at 32.
148. Id
149. Id (emphasis added).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
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possibility, of accurately ascribing a probability to all the non-genetic
evidence. 5' The proposal goes on to conclude that, "[t]ypically, all
that can be said is that if C is small then P(present/coincidence) will be
close to 1.0 for all but very small values of P(present)."'' 1 2 In other
words, if the frequency derived from the genetic evidence is low, Bayes'
Theorem will establish that a defendant was at the crime scene, except
in those situations in which the prosecution presents little against the
defendant. Presumably the authors had this in mind when earlier in
their article they stated:
It should also be noted that a probability such as 1 in 12 million
presented in the Collins case, when derived from well-defined and
independent frequencies, could reflect the guilt or innocence of a
defendant. However, this value is not the probability a person
who matches the characteristics in question is falsely accused.'
53
The authors believe such a frequency indicates guilt. They appar-
ently reason that, when plugged into Bayes' Theorem, the result will be
an almost conclusive probability that defendant was at the scene of the
crime, except in those rare cases where the assessment of non-genetic
evidence leads to an absurdly small prior probability. A look at a
slightly different application of the theorem will show that the authors'
conclusion is not always correct; the very rare frequency may not truly
prove guilt.
C Applying Bayes' Theorem to Others Than the Defendant
A person can defend against a criminal charge by proving that
someone else committed the crime. Of course, the defendant does not
actually have to establish the identity of the true criminal; all he need
show is a reasonable possibility that another person is the culprit. 5 " If
that is done, then the prosecution has not proved the case against the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant must be
acquitted.
If Bayes' Theorem truly is valuable in assessing the probability of
a defendant's guilt, it should be just as useful in weighing the odds that
someone else is guilty. The Bayesian proponents, however, have I
nored this application. Perhaps another look at People v. Collins It
indicates why.
As we have just seen, Selvin, Grunbaum, and Myhre contend that
151. "In most cases a realistic estimate of the P(present) does not exist and, therefore, the
P(present/coincidence) cannot be accurately established." Probabilily, supra note 7, at 32.
152. Id
153. Id at 28.
154. Finkelstein and Fairley seem to recognize this when they state, "The jury's function is
not to compare a defendant with a person selected randomly but to weigh the probability of
defendant's guilt against the probability that anyone else was responsible." Finkelstein & Fairley,
supra note 2, at 502 (emphasis added).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 15-26.
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when the frequency evidence gives a small probability, Bayes' Theorem
supports the inference that the defendant was not falsely accused. Ap-
parently a validly derived probability like that in Collins leads to the
conclusion of guilt.'56
As seen above, even with the Collins frequency, if the suspect pop-
ulation were large enough the odds would be good that another couple
besides the Collinses would have the characteristics of the robbers.
57
Assume that another such couple is discovered. The startling fact is
that if the slightest piece of evidence can be found from which the trier
of fact could calculate some miniscule prior probability of guilt, then
Bayes' Theorem would indicate that this other couple is guilty, too.
For instance, assume that a second couple with the described character-
istics of the Collinses is interviewed, and they state that at the time of
the robbery they were home alone together. Although the story is not
implausible, it is more likely that the guilty couple would be unable to
produce an independently verifiable alibi than an innocent couple. Of
course, the jurors might reason that many innocent people could not
give an ironclad alibi. Thus, the jurors might conclude that this second
couple's failure to give a verifiable alibi is an indicator of guilt, but only
a very slight one. Assume the jury assesses the prior probability based
on this evidence as one in 10,000, or almost no chance that this other
couple is guilty based on this one piece of weak evidence alone. Now,
however, assume that the court instructs the jury to use Bayes' Theo-
rem. The jury would calculate that with the previously set frequency
for the described characteristics of one in twelve million, the
probability that this other couple was at the crime scene becomes more
than 99.9%, even though the other evidence of guilt was negligible. 8
Thus, if the Collinses had the resources to search the entire popu-
lation, locate another couple with similar characteristics, and then find
the slightest evidence which could be interpreted as some indicator of
guilt, the Collins couple would have to be acquitted. The application
of Bayes' Theorem to this second couple would indicate that the other
couple is guilty. Since only one couple could have committed the
crime, the Collinses would have to be found not guilty. Of course, if
the other couple were put on trial, they could produce the same analy-
sis about the Collinses, and another acquittal would result. Bayes' The-
156. See supra text accompanying note 91.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 93-102.
158. The frequency of one in 12,000,000 equals .0000000833. Using the formula found in
Probability, supra note 7, at 32, and used in the text supra note 147, we have
1.0 1.0
1.0 + .0000000833(.9999/0001) 1.0 + .0000000833 x 9999
1.0
= 99.92%
1.0 + .000833
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orem, applied this way, does not simply ensure an acquittal for the
Collinses, but ensures an acquittal for everyone.
D. The Hypothetical Case and Bayes' Theorem
If Bayes' Theorem works as its advocates contend, then it should
be proper to apply the theorem not only to the defendant, but also to
other potentially guilty parties. As just seen, however, one can imagine
a situation where such application leads to ludicrous results. Outland-
ish outcomes are not limited merely to cases where the frequency is as
rare as it was in Collins. A look at our hypothetical murder' 59 with an
imaginary dialogue between jurors will illustrate why Bayes' Theorem
cannot be used in criminal cases.
Assume the jury has heard all the evidence against the defendant
along with a lucid explanation of Bayes' Theorem. The jury concludes
that the defendant's relationship as the victim's boyfriend is some evi-
dence of guilt. The jurors reason that murderers often know their vic-
tims, and therefore one who knew the victim is more likely to be guilty
than a total stranger.
The jurors also believe that the defendant's presence in the build-
ing at about the time of the murder is further evidence of guilt. There-
fore, if the state proves that the defendant was in or could have been in
the building at the time of the fatal attack, the defendant is more likely
to be guilty than a person who does not have such evidence presented
against him. Moreover, the jurors believe that because the defendant
left town shortly after the death, his conduct shows his awareness of his
guilt and tends to prove that the defendant is the murderer. Finally,
the jury considers the stormy relationship between the defendant and
the victim. They conclude that a person in a calm relationship is less
likely to harm his partner than is a person in the midst of a tempestu-
ous affair. This, too, is evidence of guilt.
The jurors concentrate on this non-genetic evidence and calculate
from it the probability that the defendant is guilty."6 They all agree
that this evidence by itself does not constitute proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. Instead, they finally agree that the non-genetic evidence
indicates a 25% chance of guilt.'6 '
The jurors then apply Bayes' Theorem by factoring in the genetic
data which indicate that the frequency of the combined phenotypes is
.001. After the calculations, the jury now concludes that the probability
159. See supra text accompanying note 69.
160. To see how workable Bayes' Theorem is, it might be useful for the reader to see what
subjective probability he derives from such evidence.
161. Of course, the genetic marker evidence only tends to prove that the defendant was pres-
ent at the crime scene and not that he was guilty. For simplicity's sake, we are making the logical
leap that if he had been present., then he is guilty.
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of guilt is .997. 162
Although the jurors realize that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
has not been defined in numerical terms, all agree that a 99.7% chance
of guilt is above that figure. The jurors start to leave their room to
deliver the guilty verdict, when one of them says, "Hold it. Bayes' The-
orem requires that we find the defendant not guilty." This lone juror
continues:
"I see two sides to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Looking at
the evidence against the defendant, we must be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime. We have done that and
seem to have concluded that he is guilty. If proof beyond a reasonable
doubt does exist against the defendant, however, then we are also say-
ing that no reasonable possibility exists that someone else did the kill-
ing. But if such a reasonable possibility does in fact exist, then I think
that we must acquit. I guess a reasonable possibility must be the differ-
ence between one and whatever probability constitutes proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. If we had decided that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt required the prosecutor reach a 99% probability of guilt, then, of
course, we would have acquitted if the proof had only reached 98%. I
think, therefore, that if a 2% chance exists that someone else did the
crime, we have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt and must
set him free."
The foreman replies, "But there can't be this 2% chance. You
should have listened more carefully to the statistician who testified. He
said that certainty in probability equals one. For example, it is certain
that a coin when flipped will come up either a head or a tail. It follows
then that the probability of either a head or a tail on a coin toss must
equal one. These two possibilities on a coin toss are mutually exclusive
of one another, that is, 'the occurrence of one necessarily precludes the
occurrence of the [other]." 6 3  The statistician explained that the
probability of one mutually exclusive event or another occurring is the
sum of the probabilities that each will occur separately. 164 When it is
certain that one of the mutually exclusive events has to occur, the sum
of probabilities equals exactly one. Thus, there are six mutually exclu-
sive events to the roll of a die. The sum of the probabilities of each
occurring separately equals precisely one. Thus, whenever mutually
exclusive events are identified and they exhaust the possibilities, the
sum of the separate probabilities will equal one.
"We have decided that the murderer's blood is on the knife," con-
tinued the foreman. "The proof is clear that only one person's blood is
162. This can be determined from the table presented by Finkelstein and Fairley. See Finkel-
stein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 500.
163. Braun, supra note 2, at 70-7 1.
164. See id. at 7 1. "Another way to view mutual exclusivity is to note that the probability of
two such events occurring simultaneously is zero because, by definition, such mutual occurrence is
impossible." Id at 71 n.139.
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on that knife. We have concluded that there is only one killer. There-
fore, if we know whose blood it is, we know who the killer is. Now,
either it is the defendant's blood on that knife and he is guilty or it is
someone else's blood. These two events are mutually exclusive and
they take in all the possibilities. That means that the sums of the
probabilities of these two events must equal exactly one.
The lone juror says, "We agree."
The foreman forges on. "Then, since we have determined that the
odds of the defendant's guilt is 99.7%, that must mean that the chances
of everyone besides the defendant being guilty are 0.3%. It just cannot
be that someone else has a probability of guilt of 2%."
The lone juror counters, "From what you say, you must agree with
me that if I can convince you that a person exists who has a probability
of guilt of, say 15%, then the defendant's probability could only be
85%."
"If you can convince me of that impossibility, I will switch my
vote since I agree that an 85% chance of guilt is not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."
The Henry Fonda-like juror continues, "We know that the blood
on the knife occurs at a rate of one in 1000 people. I think that we can
all agree that there are about fifteen million people in the metropolitan
New York City area. That means that there must be 150,000 people
around who have blood which matches that found at the scene. So far
we have only concentrated on analyzing the evidence against one of
those people, the defendant. I am positive, however, that if all those
people were investigated, we would find evidence of guilt against some
of them. Don't you think that the odds are overwhelming that at least
one of those 150,000 took a sudden trip shortly after the murder? We
considered the defendant's journey as evidence of guilt which went into
our calculation of the prior probability. Obviously the trip of any of
those 150,000 should also be considered as evidence of guilt. We would
now have a prior probability of guilt for this other person. We then
should apply Bayes' Theorem concerning this probability and the ge-
netic frequency evidence to see what probability of guilt exists for this
other person.
"Another example," he continued, "Perhaps my view of human
nature is too cynical, but I am willing to bet a bundle that if the police
could ask all 150,000 where they had been at the time of the murder,
some, either because they were guilty, just contrary, didn't like the po-
lice, had forgotten, or didn't want their spouse, boss, or parents to know
where they had actually been, would not answer truthfully. If the de-
fendant had given a false alibi we would have considered that some
evidence of guilt, and therefore it should be considered evidence of
No. 21
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guilt for those others.165
"Certainly the odds are high that one of those 150,000 recently
spent money which he or she apparently did not have a short time
before. Since the victim's purse was taken, if the defendant had re-
cently spent a sum of unaccounted for money, we would have seen that
as evidence of guilt. Consequently, sudden unexplained spending by
any of the others of our 150,000 should be treated as evidence of guilt.
"And so on. The odds seem overwhelming that if all 150,000 were
investigated as fully as the defendant, we would learn details about
some of them that would tend, if only slightly, to show that person to
be guilty. What are the probabilities of guilt from a sudden trip after
the crime or from a false alibi? If we assessed the prior probability at
only one in 10,000 from such evidence, then the genetic data and
Bayes' Theorem would indicate a 9.1% chance of guilt for this other
person. That's more than the 2% that you said couldn't exist.' 66
The foreman answers, "I see your point. Perhaps you are right
that if we knew all the facts, there might be somebody who would ap-
pear to be at least slightly guilty and who has blood like the defend-
ant's. In fact, I might agree with you and say if all 150,000 were
investigated, we certainly could expect to find somebody with enough
of a probability of guilt from the non-genetic evidence that Bayes' The-
orem coupled with the marker frequency would prove a reasonable
chance that some person other than the defendant was guilty. But we
can't reach that conclusion. The judge told us we were to use our com-
mon sense and reach a verdict based on the evidence or the lack of
evidence presented in court. We were expressly forbidden to speculate
on matters not in evidence; we were told that we could only reach de-
ductions that were supported by the evidence. While I think that it is a
fair conclusion from the evidence that people other than the defendant
have the same combination of genetic markers, it is the purest specula-
tion to assume that any evidence of guilt would be introduced against
them. Since we are forbidden to speculate about matters not supported
by the evidence, we cannot acquit on the grounds you suggest. I guess
the defendant should have introduced such evidence if he wanted us to
acquit for that reason."
"Well, I thought that the defendant didn't have to prove anything;
that the burden of proof was on the prosecutor. I doubt that there is
any way that the defendant could identify those with blood like his. I
wonder how the police do. Now that I think about it, I bet they don't.
165. See, e.g., 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 279, at 141-42 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). Peo-
ple v. Deitsch, 237 N.Y. 300, 303, 142 N.E. 670, 671 (1923).
166. Using the formula in the text accompanying supra note 147, the subsequent probability
of guilt equals
1.0
= 9.1%
1.0 + .001(.9999/.0001)
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I bet they first investigate and when they find someone whom, for
whatever reason, they suspect, they try to get his blood. If it doesn't
match, they cross that person off the suspect list. If the blood does
match, they assume that person is guilty and concentrate their investi-
gative resources to find all possible incriminating evidence against that
person. I bet they never continue to seek anyone else with the match-
ing blood much less try to get evidence of guilt against someone else.
Frankly, I can't imagine how the defendant could make up for this
police deficiency. Thus, even though my logic and common sense tell
me that if we could apply Bayes' Theorem to the other people with the
matching blood, we would find some with a reasonable chance of guilt,
those other people have not been identified and brought before the jury
for us to make an assessment of the probabilities of their guilt."
"So we are agreed that we must convict the defendant."
"Oh, no. I think that deductions based upon evidence presented in
court clearly show that a reasonable doubt exists. We know that she
was killed in her office building. We were told she worked for one of
those legal factories; somebody said that her firm, including lawyers
and support staff, employed four hundred people. We know that the
building had fifty floors. Doesn't the evidence support the conclusion
that roughly 5,000 people were in the building at the fatal time?"
"I guess so."
"It's obvious that the killer was in the building when she died.
Indeed we said that it was evidence of guilt that the defendant was seen
in the building near the time of her death. Therefore- presence in the
building is also an indicator of guilt for everyone else there when she
died. Since the murderer had to be in the building and we have con-
cluded that about 5,000 people were there then, we must mean that
anyone then present, based on that fact alone, has a one chance in
5,000 of being the murderer."
"That seems to make sense."
"Furthermore, since the genetic combination occurs once in every
thousand people and since there were 5,000 people in the building, five
people must have the blood markers we are looking for."
"Hold it. Just because the frequency is one in 1,000 and the popu-
lation is 5,000 that does not mean that there will be five people with
markers."
"Okay. I agree. However, even though the number could be
greater or fewer than five, I think that we can conclude the chances are
overwhelming that at least one other person in the building has blood
like the defendant's. 67 The prosecutor want us to use probabilities
through the use of Bayes' Theorem to find the defendant guilty.
Surely, therefore, it is all right to use statistics to reach the conclusion
167. See supra text accompanying notes 93-102.
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that someone else in the building besides the defendant has blood like
that found at the scene."
"That only seems fair."
"We said that each person in the building had a one in 5,000
chance of being guilty. The probability of guilt of the other person
assessed from the non-genetic evidence is therefore one five-thou-
sandth. If we use this prior probability in Bayes' Theorem along with
the frequency probability of one in 1,000, my calculation indicates that
this other person's probability of guilt is 16.7%.161 If we analyze the
evidence this way, the most defendant's probability of guilt would be is
83.3%. We agreed that that was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and we must acquit."
"Wait a minute. We don't know anything about this guy. Maybe
he was tied up in a meeting with twenty people from three to five on
the day of the killing. We wouldn't say there was a 16.7% chance of his
being guilty then."
"True. But, then again, maybe he was seen shortly after the mur-
der with a cut. In that case, our initial assessment of guilt would have
been higher than one in 5,000. And remember, we have just considered
the possibility that only one other person in the building has the same
genetic markers as the defendant when, of course, there are probably
more than one. In any event, your suggestion of an alibi for this other
person is pure speculation--something you have convincingly re-
minded us we cannot do. Instead, we have just used the evidence,
drawn reasonable conclusions from it, and then applied Bayes' Theo-
rem as the prosecution witness taught us to do. From this, we have
concluded that it is reasonable to believe that a 16.7% chance exists that
someone besides the defendant was the killer. We were told the burden
of proof was on the prosecutor. If this other person has an alibi or
some other evidence to show that he was not the killer, it was up to the
prosecutor to do this in order to remove what we agreed would be rea-
sonable doubt. He hasn't done that. The evidence indicates a reason-
able doubt. We must acquit."'1
69
168. Once again, using the formula in the text at supra note 147, the subsequent probability of
guilt equals
1.0
= 16.67%
1.0 + .001(.9998/.0002)
169. The flaw in the hypothetical jurors' reasoning might seem obvious; the jury has not prop-
erly set and adjusted the prior probabilities. Something more basic than that is wrong, however.
This flaw is inherent in the use of Bayes' Theorem in criminal trials-the sum of the probabilities
calculated by the theorem for all possible suspects need not equal one.
A briefer example should illustrate. Assume that the nonstatistical evidence proved conclu-
sively that the murderer was one of two people and each had an equal chance of being guilty. The
prior probability of guilt for each is .50. Suppose the investigation revealed that each suspect has
blood which matches the blood found at the scene of the crime. Such an occurrence is possible.
See Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing,
16 J. FAm. L. 543, 549 (1978) (Identical twins have the same genetic markers in their blood). If the
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VI. CONCLUSION
Because genetic markers occur independently from each other and
because studies are now available showing how frequently specified
markers appear in the population, a valid probability for a combina-
tion of genetic markers can be calculated. The introduction of this fre-
quency figure into a trial, however, is of little probative value by itself.
On the other hand, if the evidentiary effect of that probability is mis-
judged, as it easily may be, the prejudicial impact of the probability
will be great.
Most commentators who have studied the introduction of
probabilities into criminal trials agree that the dangers of introducing
such a frequency figure are great. Instead, some have argued that a
probability such as the one derived from genetic marker evidence
should be admitted into criminal trials through the use of Bayes' Theo-
rem. Others have argued that the theorem should be barred because it
would give a spuriously exact probability, tend to distort trials by a
concentration on the quantifiable evidence, and undermine our notions
of the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Most certainly, however, Bayes' Theorem should not be used sim-
ply because it often does not work.' 71 Since, as one scholar has noted,
Bayes' Theorem is "the only plausible mode of integration [of mathe-
matics into the trial process] yet proposed"' 17 ' and since this approach
fails, we are still looking for the proper way to present the probabilities
derived from the blood genetic marker evidence.
blood occurred at a frequency of one in 1,000, Bayes' Theorem indicates a subsequent probability
of .9990 for each suspect. See supra text accompanying note 115.
170. Glanville Williams describes a hypothetical situation in which it is clear that a defendant
is guilty, but Bayes' Theorem indicates only a 10% chance of guilt. Williams, supra note 77, at
347-49.
171. Tribe, smlpra note 76, at 1350.
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